APML: An Architecture Proof Modeling Language by Marmsoler, Diego & Blakqori, Genc
Table of Contents
1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
2 Background . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
2.1 Basic Mathematical Notations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
2.2 Architecture Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
2.3 Composition . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
2.4 Contracts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
2.5 Isabelle . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
3 Running Example: A Reliable Adder . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
4 Modeling Architecture Proofs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
4.1 Verifying Reliable Adder . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
4.2 Soundness and Completeness . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
5 From APML to Isabelle . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
6 Modeling Architecture Proofs in FACTUM Studio . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
7 Case Study: Trainguard MT Control System . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
8 Related Work . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
9 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
A Proof for Thm. 1 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . i
B Proof for Thm. 2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . iii
C RAdder Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . vi
D TGMT Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . x
ar
X
iv
:1
90
7.
03
72
3v
2 
 [c
s.S
E]
  1
0 J
ul 
20
19
APML: An Architecture Proof Modeling Language?
Diego Marmsoler and Genc Blakqori
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Abstract. To address the increasing size and complexity of modern software
systems, compositional verification separates the verification of single components
from the verification of their composition. In architecture-based verification, the
former is done using Model Checking, while the latter is done using interactive
theorem proving (ITP). As of today, however, architects are usually not trained in
using a full-fledged interactive theorem prover. Thus, to bridge the gap between
ITP and the architecture domain, we developed APML: an architecture proof
modeling language. APML allows one to sketch proofs about component com-
position at the level of architecture using notations similar to Message Sequence
Charts. With this paper, we introduce APML: We describe the language, show
its soundness and completeness for the verification of architecture contracts, and
provide an algorithm to map an APML proof to a corresponding proof for the
interactive theorem prover Isabelle. Moreover, we describe its implementation
in terms of an Eclipse/EMF modeling application, demonstrate it by means of a
running example, and evaluate it in terms of a larger case study. Although our
results are promising, the case study also reveals some limitations, which lead to
new directions for future work.
Keywords: Compositional Verification, Interactive Theorem Proving, Architecture-
based Verification, FACTUM, Isabelle
1 Introduction
Software intensive systems are becoming increasingly big and complex, which makes
their verification a challenge. To address this challenge, compositional verification
techniques separate the verification of single components from the verification of their
composition. In architecture-based verification (ABV) [30], for example, verification
of such systems is split into two parts: First, suitable contracts are identified for the
involved components and their implementation is verified against these contracts. Since
a single component is usually of limited complexity, in ABV this step is fully automated
using Model Checking [2]. In a second step, component contracts are combined to verify
overall system properties. Reasoning about the composition of contracts, however, might
be difficult and sometimes requires manual interaction [29]. Thus, in ABV, it is done
using interactive theorem provers, such as Isabelle [33].
? This is a post-peer-review, pre-copyedit version of an article to be published in the proceedings
of the 23rd International Symposium on Formal Methods, which will appear in Springer’s
Lecture Notes in Computer Science.
A full-fledged interactive theorem prover, however, can be quite complex and its
usage usually requires expertise which is not always available in the architecture con-
text [28]. Thus, in an effort to bridge the gap between interactive theorem proving and
the architecture domain, we developed APML: a language to specify proofs for the
composition of contracts using abstractions an architect is familiar with. APML comes
with a graphical notation, similar to Message Sequence Charts [15], to sketch proofs at
the architecture level and it is shown to be sound and complete regarding the verifica-
tion of architecture contracts. It is implemented in Eclipse/EMF [40], where it can be
used to model proofs for architecture contracts and synthesize corresponding proofs for
Isabelle’s structured proof language Isar [42,43].
The aim of this paper is to introduce APML. To this end, we provide the following
contributions: (i) We provide a formal description of APML, including a formal semantics
for architecture contracts. (ii) We show soundness and completeness of APML for the
verification of architecture contracts. (iii) We present an algorithm to map an APML
proof to a corresponding proof in Isabelle/Isar. (iv) We describe its implementation in
terms of an Eclipse/EMF modeling application. (v) We demonstrate the approach by
means of a running example and report on the outcome of a case study in which we
applied APML for the verification of a railway control system. Thereby, to the best of
our knowledge, this is the first attempt to synthesize proofs for an interactive theorem
prover from an architecture description.
Our presentation is structured as follows: In section 2, we provide some background
to clarify our understanding of architecture in general and specifically our notion of
architecture contract. In section 3, we describe our running example, a reliable calculator.
In section 4, we introduce APML, demonstrate it by verifying a property for our running
example, and present our soundness and completeness results. In section 5, we present
our algorithm to map an APML proof to a corresponding proof in Isabelle/Isar and
demonstrate it by means of the running example. In section 6, we describe the imple-
mentation of APML in terms of an Eclipse/EMF modeling application and in section 7
we describe our effort to evaluate APML by means of a larger case study. In section 8,
we discuss related work before we conclude the paper in section 9 with a brief summary
and a discussion of future work.
2 Background
2.1 Basic Mathematical Notations
For a function f : D → R, we shall use f |D′ : D′ → R to denote the restriction of f to
domain D′ ⊆ D. In addition, we shall use partial functions f : D 99K R for which we
denote with dom (f) ⊆ D its domain and with ran (f) ⊆ R its range.
We will also use finite as well as infinite sequences of elements. Thereby, we denote
with (E)∗ the set of all finite sequences over elements of a given setE, by (E)∞ the set of
all infinite sequences over E, and by (E)ω the set of all finite and infinite sequences over
E. The n-th element of a sequence s is denoted with s(n−1) and the first element is s(0).
Moreover, we shall use #s ∈ N∞ to denote the length of s. For a sequence s ∈ (D →
R)∞ of functions we shall use s|D′ to denote the sequence of all restrictions s(n)|D′ .
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2.2 Architecture Model
In our model [27,32], components communicate to each other by exchanging messages
over ports. Thus, we assume the existence of setM, containing all messages, and set P ,
containing all ports, respectively. Moreover, we postulate the existence of a type function
T : P → ℘(M) (1)
which assigns a set of messages to each port.
Ports are means to exchange messages between a component and its environment.
This is achieved through the notion of port valuation. Roughly speaking, a valuation for
a set of ports is an assignment of messages to each port.
Definition 1 (Port Valuation). For a set of ports P ⊆ P , we denote with P the set of
all possible, type-compatible port valuations, formally:
P
def
=
{
µ ∈ (P →M) | ∀p ∈ P : µ(p) ∈ T (p)}
Components communicate through interfaces by receiving messages on its input
ports and sending messages through its output ports.
Definition 2 (Interface). An interface is a pair (I ,O), consisting of disjoint sets of
input ports I ⊆ P and output ports O ⊆ P . For an interface f , we denote by in(f ) the
set of input ports, out(f ) the set of output ports, and port(f ) the set of all ports. A set
of interfaces is called disjoint iff its interfaces do not share any ports. For such sets of
interfaces, we shall use the same notation as introduced for single interfaces, to denote
their input, output, and all ports.
In addition, a component has a behavior which is given in terms of a non-empty set of
sequences of port valuations over its interface.
In our model, an architecture connects input and output ports of a set of interfaces.
Thereby, the types of connected ports must be compatible.
Definition 3 (Architecture). An architecture is a pair (F,N), consisting of a disjoint
set of interfaces F and a connection N : in(F ) 99K out(F ), such that
∀p ∈ dom (N) : T (N (p)) ⊆ T (p) (2)
Note that a connection is modeled as a partial function from input to output ports,
meaning that not every input port of an architecture is connected to a corresponding
output port and vice versa. Thus, ports of an architecture can be classified as either con-
nected (given by dom (N) ∪ ran (N)) or disconnected (given by (in(F ) \ dom (N)) ∪
(out(F ) \ ran (N))).
2.3 Composition
The interface of an architecture with its environment is given by its disconnected ports.
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Definition 4 (Architecture Interface). For an architecture A = (F,N), its interface
is defined as A⊗ = (I ,O), consisting of input ports I = in(F ) \ dom (N) and output
ports O = out(F ) \ ran (N).
Note that, since F is required to be disjoint, an architecture’s input and output ports are
guaranteed to be disjoint, too. Thus, an architecture interface fulfills all the requirements
of definition 2 and thus represents a valid interface. Hence, we can use the same notation
as introduced for interfaces to access its ports.
We can now define a notion of composition to obtain the behavior of an architecture
from the behavior of its components.
Definition 5 (Architecture Behavior). Given an architecture A = (F,N) and a non-
empty behavior Bf ⊆ (port(f ))∞ for all of its interfaces f ∈ F . The behavior of the
composition is given by a set of traces A⊗ B ⊆ (port(A⊗))∞, defined as follows:
A⊗ B def=
{
t|port(A⊗) | t ∈ (port(F ))∞ ∧ (3)(∀f ∈ F : t|port(f ) ∈ Bf ) ∧ (4)
(∀(i, o) ∈ N, n ∈ N : t(n)(i) = t(n)(o))} (5)
Roughly speaking, the behavior of a composition is defined as all traces over the archi-
tecture’s interface (Eq. (3)), which respect the behavior of each component (Eq. (4)) and
the connections imposed by the architecture (Eq. (5)).
2.4 Contracts
In the following, we are considered with the specification of architectures (as they were
described in the previous section). To this end, we assume the existence of a set of
predicates Γ (P ) to specify valuations for a set of ports P ⊆ P .
Our notion of contract is inspired by Dwyer’s work on specification patterns [18]
which is often found in practice [24]. Thereby, contracts have the form: “if P is true then
Q happens after d time points”.
Definition 6 (Contracts). A contract for an interface (I ,O) is a triple (tg , gr , d), con-
sisting of a (possibly empty) trigger tg ∈ (Γ (I ) × N)∗, a guarantee gr ∈ Γ (O), and
a duration d ∈ N. For every entry e of a trigger, we denote by state(e) its predicate
and with time(e) its time point. Moreover, we require the following conditions for a
contract:
– The time point of the first trigger is 0: time(tg(0)) = 0 (if #tg > 0).
– Triggers are ordered by their time points: ∀j, j′ < #tg : j ≤ j′ =⇒ time(tg(j)) ≤
time(tg(j′)).
– The guarantee is after the last trigger: d > time(tg(#tg−1)) (or d > 0 if tg = 〈〉).
Moreover, since they are specified over interfaces, contracts can be specified for compo-
nents as well as for architectures. They are best expressed graphically using a notation
similar to Message Sequence Charts [15] (see fig. 4 or fig. 5 for an example).
In the following, we define what it means for a behavior of a component (or architec-
ture) to satisfy a corresponding contract. Thereby, we denote with µ |= γ that a valuation
µ ∈ P satisfies a predicate γ ∈ Γ (P ).
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Definition 7 (Satisfaction). A behavior B for an interface satisfies a contract k =
(tg , gr , d) for that interface, written B |= k, whenever for all t ∈ B, satisfaction of the
triggers implies satisfaction of the guarantee:
∀n ∈ N :
((∀j < #tg : t(n+ time(tg(j))) |= state(tg(j))) =⇒ t(n+ d) |= gr)
Again, the same definition can be applied for component contracts as well as for archi-
tecture contracts.
2.5 Isabelle
Isabelle [33] is a generic proof assistant which allows mathematical formulæ to be
expressed in a formal language and which provides tools for proving those formulas in
a logical calculus. The version of Isabelle used for the work presented in this paper is
Isabelle/HOL, which includes tools to support the specification of datatypes, inductive
definitions, and recursive functions. locale name =
fixes parameter1 ::
′a⇒ ′a⇒ bool
and parameter2 ::
′a⇒ ′a⇒ bool...
assumes “formula0”
and “formula1”...
begin...
end
Fig. 1: A typical Isabelle locale.
Specifications in Isabelle are grouped into so-
called theories, which may import other theories.
To modularize results, Isabelle supports the de-
velopment of abstract specifications by means of
locales [3]. Figure 1 shows how such a locale usu-
ally looks like: It consists of a name, a list of pa-
rameters, and a list of assumptions about these pa-
rameters. In previous work [29], we show how to
map an architecture specification to a correspond-
ing Isabelle locale. Thereby, ports are mapped to
corresponding locale parameters and specifications to locale assumptions.
proof
assume label0: “formula0”
from label0 have label1: “formula1” by blast...
from label0, label1, . . . show “formulan” by blast
qed
Fig. 2: A typical Isabelle/Isar proof.
In Isabelle, proofs can be ex-
pressed in a natural way using
Isabelle’s structured proof lan-
guage Isar [43]. A typical Isar
proof is depicted in fig. 2: It con-
sists of a sequence of proof steps,
which are discharged by some
proof methods. For example, Is-
abelle’s classical reasoner blast can perform long chains of reasoning steps to prove
formulas. Or the simplifier simp can reason with and about equations. Moreover, external,
first-order provers can be invoked through sledgehammer.
3 Running Example: A Reliable Adder
As a running example, let us consider a simple system which calculates the sum of
two numbers in a redundant way. Its architecture is depicted in fig. 3: It consists of
a dispatcher component which receives two numbers as input from its environment
and forwards copies of these numbers to two different adder components. The adder
5
components then calculate the sum of the two numbers and communicate their result to
a merger component. The merger component compares the two results and forwards the
final result to its environment.
Dispatcher
i1
i2
o1
o2
o3
o4
Adder1
i1
i2
o
Adder2i1
i2
o
Merger
i1
i2 o
Fig. 3: Architecture for a reliable adder.
The behavior of each component is specified in terms of contracts (as introduced
by definition 6) by the sequence diagrams depicted in fig. 4: Figure 4a depicts contract
dispatch for the dispatcher component. It requires a dispatcher to forward incoming
messages received at ports i1 and i2, on its output ports o1− o4, within one time unit.
The contracts for the two adder components, add1 and add2, are depicted in fig. 4b
and fig. 4c, respectively. They both require an adder to calculate the sum of the numbers
obtained on its input ports i1 and i2 and output it on its output port o. For our example,
we assume that the two components use different algorithms to calculate the sum, which
is why Adder1 requires four time units while Adder2 requires only three time units
to output its result. Figure 4d, fig. 4e, and fig. 4f, depict three different contracts for
the merger component. Contract merge1 requires the merger component to compare
the messages received on its input ports i1 and i2, and for the case they coincide, to
forward the message after two time units on its output port o. Contracts merge2 and
merge3 require the merger component to cope with a potential delay of one time unit
for messages received on its input ports i2 and i1, respectively.
Dispatcher
i1=x, i2=y
[n]
o1=x, o2=y
o3=x, o4=y
[n+ 1]
(a) Contract dispatch.
Adder1
i1=x, i2=y
[n]
o=x+y
[n+ 4]
(b) Contract add1.
Adder2
i1=x, i2=y
[n]
o=x+y
[n+ 3]
(c) Contract add2.
Merger
i1=x, i2=x
[n]
o=x[n+ 2]
(d) Contract merge1.
Merger
i1=x[n]
i2=x[n+ 1]
o=x[n+ 3]
(e) Contract merge2.
Merger
i2=x[n]
i1=x[n+ 1]
o=x[n+ 3]
(f) Contract merge3.
Fig. 4: Contracts for components of reliable adder.
Among other things, we expect the resulting system to output the sum of two numbers
it receives on its input ports i1 and i2 after seven time units on its output port o . This
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can be expressed in terms of a contract over its architecture as specified by the sequence
diagram depicted in fig. 5.
Reliable Adder
i1=x, i2=y
[n]
o=x+y
[n+ 7]
Fig. 5: Contract for reliable adder.
Note that our running example is deliberately
oversimplified, since its main purpose is to demon-
strate our concepts and ideas rather than evaluat-
ing the approach in a real world scenario. For
details about how the approach works on a real
example, we refer to the description of the case
study in section 7.
4 Modeling Architecture Proofs
An architecture contract can be verified from a set of contracts for its components through
a sequence of proof steps.
Definition 8 (Proof Step). A proof step for an architecture (F,N) and corresponding
contracts Kf for its interfaces f ∈ F , is a 4-tuple s = (tp, γ, r , rf ), consisting of
– a time point tp ∈ N denoted time(s),
– an architecture state γ ∈ Γ (out(f )) (for some f ∈ F ) denoted state(s),
– a rationale r = (tg , gr , d) ∈ Kf (for some f ∈ F ) denoted rat(s),
– a (possibly empty) sequence of references rf ∈ (R)∗ denoted ref (s), such that
#rf = #tg and where R is a non-empty set of elements N ∪ (N× ℘(N)).
Note that an element of R is either a reference to an assumption N of the architecture
contract we want to prove, or a reference to another proof step N and a set of connections
℘(N). An architecture proof is given by a sequence of corresponding proof steps.
Definition 9 (Architecture Proof). Given an architecture A = (F,N) and correspond-
ing contracts Kf for its interfaces f ∈ F . An architecture proof for a contract (tg , gr , d)
over the architecture’s interface A⊗ is a finite, non-empty sequence ps of proof steps,
such that the state of the last entry implies the guarantee of the architecture contract:
state(ps(#ps − 1)) =⇒ gr (6)
the time of the last entry corresponds to the duration of the architecture contract:
time(ps(#ps − 1)) = d (7)
and for all entries 0 ≤ i < #ps , such that rat(ps(i)) = (tg ′, gr ′, d ′):
1. ps(i) refers only to triggers of the architecture contract or previous proof steps:
∀j < #ref (ps(i)) :(∀k ∈ ref (ps(i))(j) : k < #tg) ∧ (∀(k, n) ∈ ref (ps(i))(j) : k < i)
Note that this implies that ref (ps(0)) contains only references to triggers tg of the
architecture contract.
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2. The time points of the referenced entries respect the time points of the triggers of the
rationale. Thus, we first introduce a function time (for #ref (ps(i)) > 0) to return
the relative time point of a reference:
time(ref (ps(i))(j)) =
{
time(tg(k)) if k ∈ ref (ps(i))(j)
time(ps(k)) if (k, n) ∈ ref (ps(i))(j)
Now we can use this function to formalize the condition (note that by definition 8,
#ref (ps(i)) = #tg ′):
∀j < #ref (ps(i)) : time(ref (ps(i))(j)) = time(ref (ps(i))(0)) + time(tg ′(j))
Note that this condition implies that for all j < #ref (ps(i)), the referenced time
points of all entries e ∈ ref (ps(i))(j) is the same.
3. The referenced entries imply the corresponding triggers of the rationale:
∀j < #ref (ps(i)) :
 ∧
k∈ref (ps(i))(j)
state(tg(k))
 ∧
 ∧
(k,n)∈ref (ps(i))(j)
state(ps(k)) ∧
∧
(pi,po)∈n
pi = po
 =⇒ state(tg ′(j))
4. The time of the current entry respects the duration of the rationale (note that the time
of ref (ps(i))(0) corresponds to the time point of the first trigger of the rationale):
time(ps(i)) = time(ref (ps(i))(0)) + d ′
5. The guarantee of the rationale implies the current state:
gr ′ =⇒ state(ps(i))
Similar as for contracts, architecture proofs are best expressed graphically using a
notation similar to Message Sequence Charts (see fig. 6 for an example).
4.1 Verifying Reliable Adder
Table 1 shows an architecture proof for the contract of our running example depicted
in fig. 5. It consists of four steps: 0. First, we apply contract dispatch of the dis-
patcher component to trigger 0 of the architecture contract, to obtain a valuation of the
dispatcher’s output ports at time point 1 with messages x and y, respectively. 1. Then,
we use connections (a1i1 , do1 ) and (a1i2 , do2 ) to pass messages x and y to the corre-
sponding input ports of Adder1 and apply contract add1 to obtain a new state for time
point 5, in which the output port of Adder1 contains the sum of x and y. 2. Similarly,
we can use connections (a2i1 , do3 ) and (a2i2 , do4 ) to apply contract add2 to the
architecture state given by step 0, to obtain a new state for time point 4, in which the
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Table 1: Architecture proof for reliable adder.
tp γ r rf
0 1 do1 = x ∧ do2 = y dispatch {0}
1 5 a1o = x+ y add1 {(0, {(a1i1 , do1 ), (a1i2 , do2 )})}
2 4 a2o = x+ y add2 {(0, {(a2i1 , do3 ), (a2i2 , do4 )})}
3 7 mo = x+ y merge3 {(1, {(mi1 , a1o)}), (2, {(mi2 , a2o)})}
output port of Adder2 contains the sum of x and y. 3. Finally, we can use connections
(mi1 , a1o) and (mi2 , a2o) to pass the calculated sums to the input of the merger com-
ponent and apply contract merge3 to forward it on its output port. Note that the proof
is only valid, since we chose contract merge3 for the merger component. If we had
chosen merge1 or merge2, the proof would have violated condition 2 of definition 9.
As mentioned above, architecture proofs can also be expressed graphically using a
notation similar to Message Sequence Charts. For example, the proof from table 1, could
also be expressed graphically as depicted in fig. 6.
Dispatcher Adder1 Adder2 Merger
i1=x, i2=y
[n]
o1=x, o2=y
i1=x, i2=y
[n+ 1]
i1=x, i2=y
o=x+y
i1=x+y
[n+ 5]
o=x+y
i2=x+y
[n+ 4]
o=x+y
[n+ 7]
dispatch
add1
add2
merge3
Fig. 6: Architecture proof by means of Message Sequence Chart.
4.2 Soundness and Completeness
In the following, we provide two theoretical results for APML. The first one ensures
that if we can prove an architecture contract from the contracts of its components using
APML, then, an architecture in which the components satisfy the corresponding contracts
is indeed guaranteed to satisfy the architecture contract.
Theorem 1 (Soundness). Given an architecture A = (F,N) and corresponding con-
tracts Kf for each interface f ∈ F , such that ∀f ∈ F : Bf |= Kf . If there exists an
architecture proof ps for an architecture contract k = (tg , gr , d), we have A⊗B |= k.
Proof (The full proof is provided in appendix A). According to definition 7 we have
to show that for all t ∈ A⊗B and all n ∈ N,
(∀j < #tg : t(n + time(tg(j))) |=
state(tg(j))
)
=⇒ t(n+d) |= gr . Thus, we assume ∀j < #tg : t(n+time(tg(j))) |=
state(tg(j)) and we show by complete induction over the length of the proof sequence
that ∀i < #ps : t(n+time(ps(i))) |= state(ps(i)). Thus, t(n+time(ps(#ps − 1))) |=
state(ps(#ps − 1)) and, by eq. (6) and eq. (7), we can conclude t(n+ d) |= gr . uunionsq
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The second result guarantees that, whenever the satisfaction of contracts for com-
ponents of an architecture leads to the satisfaction of a corresponding contract for the
architecture, then it is possible to find a corresponding APML proof.
Theorem 2 (Completeness). Given an architecture A = (F,N) and corresponding
contracts Kf for each interface f ∈ F . For each architecture contract k, such that for
all possible behaviors B:(∀f ∈ F : Bf |= Kf ) =⇒ A⊗B |= k (8)
there exists an architecture proof ps for k = (tg , gr , d).
Proof (The full proof is provided in appendix B). For the proof we construct a “maximal”
architecture proof ps , according to definition 9, by repeatedly applying all feasible
contracts. If we eventually reach an entry such that state(ps(#ps − 1)) =⇒ gr
and time(ps(#ps − 1)) = d then we are done. If not, then we build an architecture
trace t ∈ (port(F ))∞, such that ∀j < #tg : t(time(tg(j))) |= state(tg(j)) and ∀i <
#ps : t(time(ps(i))) |= state(ps(i)) and t(d) 6|= gr and for all other n, we choose
t(n), such that the projection to every interface f ∈ F does not satisfy the assumptions
of any contract Kf . Now, we can show that ∀f ∈ F : Bf |= Kf and thus, by eq. (8) we
can conclude A⊗B |= k. Thus, since ∀j < #tg : t(time(tg(j))) |= state(tg(j)), we
can conclude t(d) |= gr which is a contradiction to t(d) 6|= gr . uunionsq
Algorithm 1 Mapping an APML proof to a corresponding proof in Isabelle/ISAR
Input: a proof ps according to definition 9 and a function toIsabelle to convert port predicates
Output: a proof in Isabelle/Isar [42]
1: i = 0
2: while i < #ps do
3: (tp, γ, r , rf ) := ps(i); (tg , gr , d) := r ;
4: if rf = 〈〉 then print “have s” + i + “: ” + toIsabelle(γ, tp) + “ by simp” else
5: i′ = 0
6: while i′ < #rf do
7: if i′ > 0 then print “moreover ” end if
8: print “from ”
9: for all i′′ ∈ rf (i′) do print “a” + i′′ + “ ” end for
10: for all (i′′, n′) ∈ rf (i′) do print “s” + i′′ + “ ” end for
11: print “have ” + toIsabelle(state(tg(i′)), time(tg(i′))) + “ ”
12: if rf (i′) \ N 6= ∅ then print “using ” end if
13: for all (i′′, n′) ∈ rf (i′) and (pi, po) ∈ n′ do print “pi_po ” end for
14: print “ by simp”
15: i′ ++
16: end while
17: if i′ = 1 then print “hence ” else
18: if i′ > 1 then print “ultimately have ” end if
19: print “s” + i + “: ” + toIsabelle(γ, tp) + “ using ” + r + “ by blast” end if
20: i++
21: end while
22: print “thus ?thesis by auto”
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5 From APML to Isabelle
To verify soundness of an APML proof, algorithm 1 shows how an APML proof can be
mapped to a corresponding Isar proof for the interactive theorem prover Isabelle.
Let us see how the algorithm can be applied to generate an Isar proof for the APML
proof of our running example, described in section 4.1. First, we create an Isabelle locale
for the architecture as described in fig. 3:
locale rsum =
fixes
— Dispatcher: di1::nat⇒nat and di2::nat⇒nat
and do1::nat⇒nat and do2::nat⇒nat and do3::nat⇒nat and do4::nat⇒nat
— Adder1: and a1i1::nat⇒nat and a1i2::nat⇒nat and a1o::nat⇒nat
— Adder2: and a2i1::nat⇒nat and a2i2::nat⇒nat and a2o::nat⇒nat
— Merger: and mi1::nat⇒nat and mi2::nat⇒nat and mo::nat⇒nat
— Contracts:
assumes dispatch:
∧
n x y. [[di1 n = x; di2 n = y]] =⇒
do1 (n+1) = x ∧ do2 (n+1) = y ∧ do3 (n+1) = x ∧ do4 (n+1) = y
and add1:
∧
n x y. [[a1i1 n = x; a1i2 n = y]] =⇒ a1o (n+4) = x + y
and add2:
∧
n x y. [[a2i1 n = x; a2i2 n = y]] =⇒ a2o (n+3) = x + y
and merge1:
∧
n x. [[mi1 n = x; mi2 n = x]] =⇒ mo (n+2) = x
and merge2:
∧
n x. [[mi1 n = x; mi2 (n+1) = x]] =⇒ mo (n+3) = x
and merge3:
∧
n x. [[mi2 n = x; mi1 (n+1) = x]] =⇒ mo (n+3) = x
— Connections
and do1-a1i1:
∧
n. a1i1 n = do1 n and a1i2-do2:
∧
n. a1i2 n = do2 n
and do3-a2i1:
∧
n. a2i1 n = do3 n and a2i2-do4:
∧
n. a2i2 n = do4 n
and a1o-mi1:
∧
n. mi1 n = a1o n and mi2-a2o:
∧
n. mi2 n = a2o n
Note that each contract, as presented in fig. 4, results in a corresponding locale assump-
tion. Now, we can create a theorem for the architecture contract described by fig. 5:
theorem sum:
fixes n x y assumes a0: di1 n = x ∧ di2 n = y
shows mo (n+7) = x + y
Finally, we can apply algorithm 1 to create an Isar proof for the theorem from the APML
proof described in table 1:
proof −
from a0 have di1 n = x ∧ di2 n = y by auto
hence s1: do1 (n+1) = x ∧ do2 (n+1) = y ∧ do3 (n+1) = x ∧ do4 (n+1) = y
using dispatch by blast
from s1 have a1i1 (n+1) = x ∧ a1i2 (n+1) = y using do1-a1i1 a1i2-do2 by auto
hence s2: a1o (n+5) = x + y using add1 by blast
from s1 have a2i1 (n+1) = x ∧ a2i2 (n+1) = y using do3-a2i1 a2i2-do4 by auto
hence s3: a2o (n+4) = x + y using add2 by blast
from s2 have mi1 (n+5) = x + y using a1o-mi1 by auto
moreover from s3 have mi2 (n+4) = x + y using mi2-a2o by auto
ultimately have mo (n+7) = x+y using merge3 by blast
thus ?thesis by auto
qed
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6 Modeling Architecture Proofs in FACTUM Studio
To support the development of APML proofs in practice, we implemented the language in
FACTUM Studio [31]: an architecture modeling application based on Eclipse/EMF [40].
FACTUM Studio now supports the user in the development of “correct” APML proofs
by means of three key features: (i) It analyses the structure of a given APML proof and
checks it for syntactical errors. (ii) It uses so-called validators to check for violations of
the conditions described in definition 8 and, to a limited extent, also the ones described in
definition 9. (iii) The textual development of APML proofs in Xtext [5] is complemented
by corresponding graphical notations using Sirius [34]. To support the verification of sin-
gle proof steps, we implemented algorithm 1 in FACTUM Studio. Thus, after specifying
an APML proof, a user can automatically generate a corresponding Isar proof for Isabelle.
Figure 7 depicts the specification of our running example in FACTUM Studio:
First, the architecture is specified graphically in terms of interfaces (represented as gray
rectangles) and connections between their input (empty circles) and output (filled circles)
ports. Then, contracts can be added for each component using a textual notation.
Fig. 7: Specification of reliable adder in FACTUM Studio.
Fig. 8: APML proof in FACTUM Studio.
Figure 8 shows how we can verify the
adder system using FACTUM Studio’s
APML implementation: After specifying
the contract, we can provide a correspond-
ing proof in terms of a sequence of proof
steps as described in definition 8.
As mentioned above, FACTUM Stu-
dio performs several checks to ensure con-
sistency of proofs: (i) For each step it
checks whether enough rationales are pro-
vided (last condition of definition 8). (ii) It
verifies that only existing connections are
used in the “with” clause (last condition
of definition 8). (iii) It ensures that each
step only refers to triggers of the contract
or previous proof steps (condition 1 of
definition 9) (iv) It ensures consistency of
the time points of contracts with those of rationales (conditions 2 and 4 of definition 9).
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Fig. 9: Automatic Train Control System
7 Case Study: Trainguard MT Control System
We evaluated our approach by applying it for the verification of a railway-control system.
To investigate whether the approach can indeed be used to apply interactive theorem
proving by users not trained in using this technology, verification was performed by a
subject with no prior experience with formal methods in general and specifically with
the use of interactive theorem provers. The subject holds a Bachelor of Science degree
in computer science and has four years of industrial experience as software developer in
the domain of business information systems.
Study Context. Trainguard MT (TGMT) is an automatic train control system for
metros, rapid transit, commuter, and light rail systems currently in development by one of
our industrial partners. For the purpose of this case study, we focused on the verification
of one key feature of TGMT: controlling of the platform screen doors (PSDs). The
situation is depicted by fig. 9: In an effort to make train stations safer for the passengers,
modern stations protect their rail zone with a wall (represented by a black line) with
several doors (represented by gray lines), the so-called PSDs. When a train arrives at the
station, its onboard control unit communicates with the Wayside control unit to control
opening/closing of the PSDs.
Study Setup. To model the PSD functionality, the company provided four documents
as input, which were taken directly from the PSD development: a high-level system
requirements specification (59 pages), a more detailed system architecture specification
(299 pages), a performance specification (57 pages), and a glossary (42 pages). Based
on the documents, we specified a corresponding architecture for the PSD functionality,
consisting of 33 components with 36 contracts in total.
Study Execution. The subject then verified five architecture contracts: (P1) If the
train is moving, the PSDs are closed. (P2) If the train is at standstill and the position of
the train doors match the position of the PSDs, the PSDs are opened. (P3) If the train
doors open on the right hand side, the platform must be on the right hand side. (P4) If
door release is permissive and the train is at standstill, its doors are open. (P5) When
the train indicates that the doors are closed, the PSDs are closed.
Results. After a study of the architecture and a brief introduction into APML, the
subject was able to verify versions of all the properties with no further guidance.
P1
P2
P3
P4
P5
14
14
1
1
15
Fig. 10: Number of proof steps for
each property.
Figure 10 depicts the verification effort in terms
of APML proof steps required for each property.
In total, the subject required roughly 25 working
hours to develop the proofs. Sometimes, however,
the original contracts needed to be adapted to
fit the structure of a contract as defined by def-
inition 6. This was mainly due to two reasons:
(i) Some of the contracts required to express state-
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ments of the form “whenever x happens, after n time points y happens and in between
z holds”. (ii) In addition, some components required contracts combined by disjunction
rather than conjunction. Moreover, the proofs for properties P1 and P5 share a common
proof sequence of 8 proof steps, which is more than 50% of the steps required to proof
the properties. Finally, some of the proof steps could only be discharged by adapting
the generated Isabelle script to tune the simplifier and the logical reasoner, respectively.
Conclusions. From our results, we derive the following conclusions:
C1 The approach can be used to support users with no prior experience with formal
methods in the development of proofs for interactive theorem provers.
C2 Some of the properties sometimes required in a practical setting cannot yet be
expressed by the notion of contract used in this paper.
C3 The verification of properties can involve considerable, redundant proof sequences.
C4 Some initial setup may be required to automatically discharge generated proof steps.
8 Related Work
Related work can be found in two different areas: verification of contract-based specifi-
cations and interactive verification of component-based systems.
Verification of contract-based specifications. Verification of contract-based speci-
fications is not a new topic, at all. First works in this area go back to Pnueli’s work
about modular model checking [36] and Clarke’s work on compositional model check-
ing [14], in which they investigated possibilities to leverage assumptions about a com-
ponent’s environment for the verification of its implementation. Later on, attempts
were made to automatically synthesize minimal assumptions from a component’s im-
plementation [7,19,20,35]. In all these studies, the focus is mainly on the verification
of component implementations under the presence of assumptions about its environ-
ment. In contrary, the focus of the work presented in this paper, is on the verification of
contract-composition, without even considering component implementations.
Another line of research in this area is work which focuses on the analysis of contract
compatibility. In parametric AG reasoning [38], there may even be many assumptions
and guarantees for each component. An example of work in this area is Damm et al. [16],
in which the authors describe an approach for virtual integration testing based on rich
components. Another example is the work of Chilton et al. [11], which provides an
approach to AG reasoning for safety properties. Later on, Kugele and Marmsoler [25]
provide an approach to check compatibility of AG contracts using SMT solvers [17].
Finally, Broy [8] provides a detailed characterization about compatible assumptions and
guarantees for FOCUS [9]. While the work in this line of research also focuses on the
verification at the level of contracts, the focus is mainly on the verification of contract
compatibility. With our work, however, we focus on a related, though different problem:
verification of refinement of contracts.
Work in this area of research which is most closely related to our work is Cimatti’s
work on OCRA [12,13]. Here, the author proposes an approach based on bounded model
checking [6] to verify refinement of LTL-based contracts. With our work, we follow a
similar goal by applying an alternative approach based on interactive theorem proving,
which is why we actually complement Cimatti’s work.
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Interactive Verification Component based Systems. There exists some work which
investigates the application of interactive theorem proving (ITP) for the verification
of component-based systems. Fensel and Schnogge [21], for example, apply the KIV
interactive theorem prover [37] to verify architectures in the area of knowledge-based
systems. More recently, some attempts were made to apply ITP for the verification of
architectural connectors: Li and Sun [26], for example, apply the Coq proof assistant [4]
to verify connectors specified in Reo [1]. Moreover, there exists work on the formalization
of OCL [41] in Isabelle [10]. In addition, Spichkova [39] provides a framework for the
verification of component-based systems in Isabelle and Marmsoler [28] extends the work
to deal with dynamic reconfiguration. Also the mechanization of UTP [23] in Isabelle,
due by Foster et al. [22], belongs to this line of research. However, while most of these
works focus on the interactive verification of component based systems, verification
is usually done at the level of the prover. With the work presented in this paper, we
aim to contribute to this line of research by exploring possibilities and limitations of
synthesizing proofs for the provers from architectural descriptions.
Summary. Concluding, to the best of our knowledge, this is the first attempt to synthe-
size proof for an interactive theorem prover for the verification of contract composition
from architectural descriptions.
9 Conclusion
With this paper, we introduced APML: an architecture proof modeling language. To this
end, we first introduced a formal semantics for component contracts as well as archi-
tecture contracts. Then, we described APML and showed soundness and completeness
of it for the verification of architecture contracts. Moreover, we presented an algorithm
to map an APML proof to a corresponding proof in Isabelle/Isar and discussed its imple-
mentation in Eclipse/EMF. Finally, we demonstrated the approach by means of a running
example and evaluated it by means of a larger case study from the railway domain.
Our theoretical results (Section 4.2) show that APML can indeed be used to specify
abstract proofs for the composition of contracts using a notation similar to Message
Sequence Charts. Moreover, as indicated by C1 of our case study, it supports users with
no prior experience in interactive theorem proving in the development of proofs. Thus,
APML indeed contributes to the overall goal of bridging the gap between software archi-
tecture and interactive theorem proving. Nevertheless, the case study also revealed some
limitations of the approach, which should be addressed by future work: As indicated
by C2, future work should investigate possibilities to enhance expressiveness of the
contracts. Specifically, the support for until-like contracts and disjunction of contracts
should be investigated. Moreover, as indicated by C3, future work should investigate pos-
sibilities to support reuse of proof sequences. To this end, a proof step should be allowed
to reference to already verified contracts. Finally, as indicated by C4, future work should
investigate possibilities to increase automation at the level of interactive theorem proving.
Acknowledgments. We would like to thank Simon Foster and Mario Gleirscher for
inspiring discussions about APML. Parts of the work on which we report in this paper
was funded by the German Federal Ministry of Education and Research (BMBF) under
grant no. 01Is16043A.
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A Proof for Thm. 1
The following diagram depicts an overview of the main concepts and its relationships
and marks the proof obligation with a question mark:
A
Kf k
Bf A⊗B
|= |= ?
ps
Def. 5
According to Def. 7 we have to show that for all t ∈ A⊗B and all n ∈ N,
(∀i <
#tg : t(n+ time(tg(i))) |= state(tg(i))) =⇒ t(n+ d) |= gr .
– Thus, we assume
∀i < #tg : t(n+ time(tg(i))) |= state(tg(i)) (9)
and we show by induction that ∀i < #ps : t(n+ time(ps(i))) |= state(ps(i)).
• Thus, fix i < #ps and assume ∀i′ < i : t(n+ time(ps(i′))) |= state(ps(i′)).
• Let (tp, γ, r , rf ) = ps(i).
• Since, by assumption, we have ∀f ∈ F : Bf |= Kf , conclude Bf |= r for some
f ∈ F .
• Thus, let r = (tg ′, gr ′, d ′) and by Def. 7 have ∀t′ ∈ Bf , n′ ∈ N :
(∀i′′ <
#tg ′ : t′(n′ + time(tg ′(i′′))) |= state(tg ′(i′′))) =⇒ t′(n′ + d ′) |= gr ′.
• Thus, by Eq. (4) of Def. 5 have ∀n′ ∈ N : (∀i′′ < #tg ′ : t(n′ +
time(tg ′(i′′))) |= state(tg ′(i′′))) =⇒ t(n′ + d ′) |= gr ′.
• Thus, we show ∀i′′ < #tg ′ : t(n + time(rf (0)) + time(tg ′(i′′))) |=
state(tg ′(i′′)) to conclude t(n+ time(rf (0)) + d ′) |= gr ′.
∗ Thus, let i′′ < #tg ′ and since by Def. 8 #rf = #tg ′, conclude i′′ < #rf .
∗ Thus, by condition 3 of Def. 9 have ∧
i′′′∈rf (i′′)
state(tg(i′′′))
 ∧
 ∧
(i′′′,n′′)∈rf (i′′)
state(ps(i′′′))∧
∧
(pi,po)∈n′′
pi=po
=⇒state(tg ′(i′′))
∗ Thus, we show
∀i′′′ ∈ rf (i′′) : t(n+ time(rf (0)) + time(tg ′(i′′))) |= state(tg(i′′′))
(10)
and
∀(i′′′,n′′)∈rf (i′′) : t(n+time(rf (0))+time(tg ′(i′′)))|=state(ps(i′′′))
∧ ∀(pi, po) ∈ n′′ : t(n+ time(rf (0)) + time(tg ′(i′′))) |= pi = po
(11)
i
to conclude t(n+ time(rf (0)) + time(tg ′(i′′))) |= state(tg ′(i′′)):
· Eq. (10): Let i′′′ ∈ rf (i′′) and have i′′′ < #tg by condition 1 of Def. 9.
Thus, have t(n + time(tg(i′′′))) |= state(tg(i′′′)) by Eq. (9). More-
over, since i′′′ ∈ rf (i′′) have time(rf (i′′)) = time(tg(i′′′)) from the
definition of time in condition 2 of Def. 9. Thus, since rf = ref (ps(i))
and i′′ < #ref (ps(i)) (since i′′ < #tg ′ and by Def. 8 #tg ′ =
#ref (ps(i))) have time(tg(i′′′)) = time(rf (0)) + time(tg ′(i′′))
by condition 2 of Def. 9. Thus, since t(n + time(tg(i′′′))) |=
state(tg(i′′′)) conclude t(n + time(rf (0)) + time(tg ′(i′′))) |=
state(tg(i′′′)).
· Eq. (11): We show that for all (i′′′, n′′) ∈ rf (i′′),
t(n+ time(rf (0)) + time(tg ′(i′′))) |= state(ps(i′′′)) (12)
and
∀(pi, po) ∈ n′′ : t(n+time(rf (0))+time(tg ′(i′′))) |= pi = po (13)
Thus, let (i′′′, n′′) ∈ rf (i′′).
· Eq. (12): By condition 1 of Def. 9, i′′′ < i and thus we can apply the
induction hypothesis to have t(n+time(ps(i′′′))) |= state(ps(i′′′)).
Moreover, since (i′′′, n′′) ∈ rf (i′′) have time(ps(i′′′)) =
time(rf (i′′)) from the definition of time in condition 2 of Def. 9.
Thus, since rf = ref (ps(i)) and i′′ < #ref (ps(i)) (since i′′ <
#tg ′ and by Def. 8 #tg ′ = #ref (ps(i))) have time(ps(i′′′)) =
time(rf (0)) + time(tg ′(i′′)) by condition 2 of Def. 9. Thus,
since t(n + time(ps(i′′′))) |= state(ps(i′′′)) conclude t(n +
time(rf (0)) + time(tg ′(i′′))) |= state(ps(i′′′)).
· Eq. (13): Let (pi, po) ∈ n′′ and conclude (pi, po) ∈ N from
Def. 8. Thus, by Eq. (5) of Def. 5 have t(n + time(rf (0)) +
time(tg ′(i′′)))(i) = t(n+time(rf (0))+time(tg ′(i′′)))(o). Finally
conclude t(n+ time(rf (0)) + time(tg ′(i′′))) |= pi = po.
• From t(n+time(rf (0))+d ′) |= gr ′ we can conclude t(n+time(ps(i))) |= gr ′
by condition 4 of Def. 9 (since rf = ref (ps(i))).
• Thus, we conclude t(n+ time(ps(i))) |= state(ps(i)) by condition 5 of Def. 9.
– From ∀i < #ps : t(n+ time(ps(i))) |= state(ps(i)) have t(n+ time(ps(#ps −
1))) |= state(ps(#ps − 1)) (since by Def. 9 #ps ≥ 1).
– Thus, from Eq. (6) of Def. 9 have t(n+ time(ps(#ps − 1))) |= gr .
– Thus, from Eq. (7) of Def. 9 have t(n+ d) |= gr .
uunionsq
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B Proof for Thm. 2
The proof proceeds in four steps: First, we construct a “maximal” architecture proof.
If it is a valid proof for the architecture contract, we are done, otherwise, we derive a
contradiction: To this end, we construct an architecture trace which satisfies all contracts
but violates the guarantee of the architecture contract.
The following figure depicts the relationship of an architecture proof (consisting
of a sequence of proof steps) and an architecture trace (consisting of a sequence of
architecture states).
. . .
Constructing the Architecture Proof
For the proof we construct a “maximal” architecture proof ps , according to Def. 9, by
repeatedly applying all feasible contracts:
– closure: for all contracts (tg ′, gr ′, d ′) we have:
∀i < #tg ′ ∃n :∧
{x∈tg : time(x)=n+time(tg′(i))}
state(x ) ∧
∧
{s∈ps : time(s)=n+time(tg′(i))}
state(s)
=⇒ state(tg ′(i)) (14)
implies
∃i′ < #ps : rat(ps(i′)) = c ∧ time(ps(i′)) = n+ d ′ (15)
– strongest: for all i < #ps , such that rat(ps(i)) = (tg ′, gr ′, d ′), we have
state(ps(i)) =⇒ gr ′ (16)
If we eventually reach an entry such that state(ps(#ps − 1)) =⇒ gr and
time(ps(#ps − 1)) = d then we are done.
Constructing the Architecture Trace
If not, then we build an architecture trace t ∈ (port(F ))∞, such that
– t is the weakest architecture satisfying the architectural assumptions, i.e., for all
n ∈ N, such that ∃i < #tg : time(tg(i)) = n or ∃i < #ps : time(ps(i)) = n, we
have
t(n) |=
∧
{x∈tg : time(x)=n}
state(x ) ∧
∧
{s∈ps : time(s)=n}
state(s) (17)
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and
∀P ∈ Γ (out(F )) : (t(n) |= P ) =⇒ ∧
{x∈tg : time(x)=n}
state(x ) ∧
∧
{s∈ps : time(s)=n}
state(s)
 =⇒ P
 (18)
– for all other n ∈ N (where ¬∃i < #tg : time(tg(i)) = n and ¬∃i <
#ps : time(ps(i)) = n) it does not satisfy any assumption:
∀n′ ∈ N, (tg ′, gr ′, d ′) ∈ Kf , i < #tg ′ :
(
n′ + time(tg ′(i)) = n ∧(∀i′ < #tg ′ : n′+time(tg ′(i′)) 6= n =⇒ t(n′+time(tg ′(i′))) |= state(tg ′(i′))))
=⇒ t(n′ + time(tg ′(i))) 6|= state(tg ′(i))
(19)
– t does not satisfy the guarantee at the time point given by the duration:
t(d) 6|= gr (20)
Lemma: Application of Contracts in Proofs
If a contract can be applied to t, then it is applied in the proof:
∀n ∈ N, c = (tg ′, gr ′, d ′) ∈ Kf :(
(∀i < #tg ′ : (t(n+ time(tg ′(i))) |= state(tg ′(i))))
=⇒ (∃i′ < #ps : rat(ps(i′)) = c ∧ time(ps(i′)) = n+ d ′)
)
(21)
– Assume there exists an n and c = (tg ′, gr ′, d ′) ∈ Kf , such that
∀i < #tg ′ : (t(n+ time(tg ′(i))) |= state(tg ′(i))) (22)
– According to Eq. (19), (17), (18), for all i < #tg ′
t(n+ time(tg ′(i))) |=∧
{x∈tg : time(x)=n+time(tg′(i))}
state(x ) ∧
∧
{s∈ps : time(s)=n+time(tg′(i))}
state(s)
(23)
and
∀P ∈ Γ (out(F )) : (t(n+ time(tg ′(i))) |= P ) =⇒∧
{x∈tg : time(x)=n+time(tg′(i))}
state(x ) ∧
∧
{s∈ps : time(s)=n+time(tg′(i))}
state(s)
=⇒ P (24)
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– Thus, since ∀i < #tg ′ : t(n + time(tg ′(i))) |= state(tg ′(i)) we have for all
i < #tg ′: ∧
{x∈tg : time(x)=n+time(tg′(i))}
state(x ) ∧
∧
{s∈ps : time(s)=n+time(tg′(i))}
state(s)
=⇒ state(tg ′(i)) (25)
– Thus, since ps is maximal (Eq. (15)), there must exist an entry i′ < #ps , such that
rat(ps(i′)) = c ∧ time(ps(i′)) = n+ d ′.
Deriving the Contradiction
Now, we can show that ∀f ∈ F : Bf |= Kf .
– Assume ¬∀f ∈ F : Bf |= Kf .
– Thus, ∃f ∈ F : Bf 6|= Kf and hence ∃K = (tg ′, gr ′, d ′) ∈ Kf : t 6|= K.
– Thus, according to Def. 7 we have ∃n ∈ N :
((∀i < #tg ′ : t(n+ time(tg ′(i))) |=
state(tg ′(i))
) ∧ t(n+ d ′) 6|= gr ′).
– Thus, according to Eq. (21), ∃i′ < #ps : rat(ps(i′)) = K∧ time(ps(i′)) = n+d ′.
– Thus, according to Eq. (17), t(n+ d ′) |= state(ps(i′)).
– Moreover, since rat(ps(i′)) = K have state(ps(i′)) =⇒ gr ′ according to
Eq. (16).
– Thus, since t(n + d ′) |= state(ps(i′)) conclude t(n + d ′) |= gr ′ which is a
contradiction to t(n+ d ′) 6|= gr ′.
Thus, by Eq. (8) we can conclude A⊗B |= k. Moreover, by Eq. (17) we can conclude
∀i < #tg : t(time(tg(i))) |= state(tg(i)). Thus, since A⊗B |= k, according to Def. 7,
we can conclude t(d) |= gr which is a contradiction to Eq. (20). uunionsq
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C RAdder Model
Pattern TrainguardMT ShortName tgmt {
DTSpec {
DT Basic (
Sort NAT
Operation add: NAT, NAT => NAT
)
}
CTypes {
CType Merger {
InputPorts {
InputPort i1 (Type: Basic.NAT),
InputPort i2 (Type: Basic.NAT)
}
OutputPorts {
OutputPort o (Type: Basic.NAT)
}
Contracts {
Contract merge1 {
var x: Basic.NAT
triggers {
t1: [i1=x] /\ [i2=x]
}
guarantees {
[o=x]
}
duration 7
},
Contract merge2 {
var x: Basic.NAT
triggers {
t1: [i1=x],
t2: [i2=x] at 1
}
guarantees {
[o=x]
}
duration 3
},
Contract merge3 {
var x: Basic.NAT
triggers {
t1: [i2=x],
t2: [i1=x] at 1
vi
}
guarantees {
[o=x]
}
duration 3
}
}
},
CType Dispatcher {
InputPorts {
InputPort i1 (Type: Basic.NAT),
InputPort i2 (Type: Basic.NAT)
}
OutputPorts {
OutputPort o1 (Type: Basic.NAT),
OutputPort o2 (Type: Basic.NAT),
OutputPort o3 (Type: Basic.NAT),
OutputPort o4 (Type: Basic.NAT)
}
Contracts {
Contract dispatch {
var x: Basic.NAT,
var y: Basic.NAT
triggers {
t1: [i1=x] /\ [i2=y]
}
guarantees {
[o1=x] /\ [o2=y] /\ [o3=x] /\ [o4=y]
}
duration 1
}
}
},
CType Adder1 {
InputPorts {
InputPort i1 (Type: Basic.NAT),
InputPort i2 (Type: Basic.NAT)
}
OutputPorts {
OutputPort o (Type: Basic.NAT)
}
Contracts {
Contract add1 {
var x: Basic.NAT,
var y: Basic.NAT
vii
triggers {
t1: [i1=x] /\ [i2=y]
}
guarantees {
[o=Basic.add[x,y]]
}
duration 4
}
}
},
CType Adder2 {
InputPorts {
InputPort i1 (Type: Basic.NAT),
InputPort i2 (Type: Basic.NAT)
}
OutputPorts {
OutputPort o (Type: Basic.NAT)
}
Contracts {
Contract add2 {
var x: Basic.NAT,
var y: Basic.NAT
triggers {
t1: [i1=x] /\ [i2=y]
}
guarantees {
[o=Basic.add[x,y]]
}
duration 3
}
}
}
}
Contracts {
Contract sum {
var x: Basic.NAT,
var y: Basic.NAT
triggers {
t1: [Dispatcher.i1=x] /\ [Dispatcher.i2=y]
}
guarantees {
[Merger.o=Basic.add[x,y]]
}
duration 7
proof {
viii
s0: at 1
have [Dispatcher.o1=x] /\ [Dispatcher.o2=y]
from [
t1
]
using Dispatcher.dispatch,
s1: at 5
have
[Adder1.o=Basic.add[x,y]]
from [
s0 with [
(Adder1.i1, Dispatcher.o1),
(Adder1.i2, Dispatcher.o2)
]
]
using Adder1.add1,
s2: at 4
have
[Adder2.o=Basic.add[x,y]]
from [
s0 with [
(Adder2.i1, Dispatcher.o3),
(Adder2.i2, Dispatcher.o4)
]
]
using Adder2.add2,
s3: at 7
have
[Merger.o=Basic.add[x,y]]
from [
s1 with [
(Merger.i1, Adder1.o)
],
s2 with [
(Merger.i2, Adder2.o)
]
]
using Merger.merge3
}
}
}
}
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D TGMT Model
Pattern TrainguardMT ShortName tgmt {
DTSpec {
DT Status (
Sort INT
),
DT Int (
Sort INT
Operation add: INT, INT => INT,
sub: INT, INT => INT
),
DT DoorStatus (
Sort DoorStatus
Predicate DT_DoorStatus_DoorsOpen: DoorStatus,
DT_DoorStatus_DoorsVitalClosed: DoorStatus
),
DT Bool (
Sort BOOLEAN
Predicate true: BOOLEAN,
false: BOOLEAN
),
DT Comparison (
Operation ls: Int.INT, Int.INT => Bool.BOOLEAN,
x
gt: Int.INT, Int.INT => Bool.BOOLEAN
),
DT Command (
Sort STRING
),
DT DoorReleaseCommand (
Sort DoorReleaseCommand
Predicate DT_DoorReleaseCommand_Right:
DoorReleaseCommand,
DT_DoorReleaseCommand_Left: DoorReleaseCommand,
DT_DoorReleaseCommand_Both: DoorReleaseCommand,
DT_DoorReleaseCommand_Deactivate: DoorReleaseCommand
),
DT DoorOpenStrategy (
Sort DoorOpenStrategy
Predicate DT_DoorOpenStrategy_Right: DoorOpenStrategy,
DT_DoorOpenStrategy_Left: DoorOpenStrategy
),
DT DoorReleaseStatus (
Sort DoorReleaseStatus
Predicate DT_DoorReleaseStatus_Released:
DoorReleaseStatus,
DT_DoorReleaseStatus_Locked: DoorReleaseStatus
xi
),
DT DoorStatus (
Sort DoorStatus
Predicate DT_DoorStatus_Opened: DoorStatus,
DT_DoorStatus_Closed: DoorStatus
),
DT MovingStatus (
Sort MovingStatus
Predicate DT_TrainMovingStatus_Moving: MovingStatus,
DT_TrainMovingStatus_StandStill: MovingStatus
),
DT DoorCommand (
Sort DoorCommand
Predicate DT_DoorCommand_Open: DoorCommand,
DT_DoorCommand_Close: DoorCommand
),
DT TrainControlLevel (
Sort TrainControlLevel
Predicate DT_TrainControlLevel_CTC: TrainControlLevel,
DT_TrainControlLevel_ITC: TrainControlLevel
),
DT PSD_Authorization (
Sort PSD_Authorization
xii
Predicate DT_PSD_Authorization_Authorize:
PSD_Authorization,
DT_PSD_Authorization_Not_Authorize: PSD_Authorization
),
DT PlatformPSDStatus (
Sort PlatformPSDStatus
Predicate DT_PlatformPSDStatus_Has_PSD:
PlatformPSDStatus,
DT_PlatformPSDStatus_Has_Not_PSD: PlatformPSDStatus
),
DT StoppingWindow (
Sort StoppingWindow
Predicate DT_StoppingWindow_WithinStoppingWindow:
StoppingWindow,
DT_StoppingWindow_OutsideStoppingWindow:
StoppingWindow
),
DT Time (
Sort INT
),
DT Authority (
Sort STRING
)
}
xiii
CTypes {
/*
* OBCU ATO Components
*/
CType OBCU_ATO_In_Converter {
InputPorts {
InputPort AB_I_Door_Operating_Mode (Type: DoorStatus.
DoorStatus),
InputPort AB_I_Premissive_Door_Button (Type: Bool.
BOOLEAN),
InputPort CAB_I_Door_Command (Type: DoorCommand.
DoorCommand),
InputPort CL_I_Door_Closed_Indication (Type:
DoorStatus.DoorStatus)
}
OutputPorts {
OutputPort doorStatus (Type: Status.INT),
OutputPort cabDoorCommand (Type: DoorCommand.
DoorCommand),
OutputPort cabPremissiveDoorButton (Type: Bool.
BOOLEAN),
OutputPort cabPremissiveDoorMode (Type: Status.INT)
}
},
CType OBCU_ATO_Door_Mode_Controller {
InputPorts {
xiv
InputPort trainOperationMode (Type: Status.INT),
InputPort platformPSDStatus (Type: Status.INT),
InputPort trainControlLevel(Type: Status.INT),
InputPort cabPremissiveDoorButton (Type: Bool.BOOLEAN
),
InputPort cabPremissiveDoorMode (Type: Status.INT)
}
OutputPorts {
OutputPort doorMode (Type: Status.INT)
}
},
CType OBCU_ATO_Door_Open_Controller {
InputPorts {
InputPort doorMode (Type: Status.INT),
InputPort dwellTimeElapsed (Type: Bool.BOOLEAN),
InputPort releaseForcedByPermissiveDoorButton (Type:
Bool.BOOLEAN),
InputPort doorReleaseStatus (Type: DoorReleaseStatus.
DoorReleaseStatus),
InputPort trainControlLevel (Type: Status.INT)
}
OutputPorts {
OutputPort doorOpenCommand (Type: DoorCommand.
DoorCommand)
xv
}Contracts {
Contract doorsOpened {
triggers {
doorReleased: DoorReleaseStatus.
DT_DoorReleaseStatus_Released[doorReleaseStatus
],
timeNotElapsed: Bool.false[dwellTimeElapsed] at 1
}
guarantees {
DoorCommand.DT_DoorCommand_Open[doorOpenCommand]
}
duration 2
},
Contract doorsClosed {
triggers {
doorReleased: DoorReleaseStatus.
DT_DoorReleaseStatus_Locked[doorReleaseStatus]
}
guarantees {
DoorCommand.DT_DoorCommand_Close[doorOpenCommand]
}
duration 1
}
xvi
}},
CType OBCU_ATO_Train_Door_Supervision_Mode_Controller {
InputPorts {
InputPort movingStatus (Type: MovingStatus.
MovingStatus),
InputPort doorReleaseStatus (Type: Time.INT),
InputPort cabPremissiveDoorButton (Type: Bool.BOOLEAN
),
InputPort trainControlLevel (Type: Status.INT),
InputPort doorStatus (Type: Status.INT)
}
OutputPorts {
OutputPort trainSupervision (Type: Bool.BOOLEAN)
}
},
CType OBCU_ATO_Train_Door_Supervision_Controller {
InputPorts {
InputPort trainSupervision (Type: Bool.BOOLEAN),
InputPort trainControlLevel (Type: Status.INT),
InputPort doorStatus (Type: Status.INT)
}
OutputPorts {
OutputPort trainMovement (Type: Bool.BOOLEAN)
xvii
}},
CType OBCU_ATO_PSD_Door_Controller {
InputPorts {
InputPort openDoorCommand (Type: DoorCommand.
DoorCommand),
InputPort cabDoorCommand (Type: DoorCommand.
DoorCommand),
InputPort trainControlLevel (Type: TrainControlLevel.
TrainControlLevel)
}
OutputPorts {
OutputPort psdDoorCommand (Type: DoorCommand.
DoorCommand)
}
Contracts {
Contract forwardDoorCommand {
triggers {
controlLevelCTC: TrainControlLevel.
DT_TrainControlLevel_CTC[trainControlLevel]
}
guarantees {
[psdDoorCommand = openDoorCommand]
}
duration 1
xviii
}}
},
CType OBCU_ATO_PSD_Door_Command_State {
InputPorts {
InputPort openDoorCommand (Type: DoorCommand.
DoorCommand)
}
OutputPorts {
OutputPort psdDoorCommandState (Type: DoorCommand.
DoorCommand)
}
Contracts {
Contract forwardingCommand {
guarantees {
[psdDoorCommandState = openDoorCommand]
}
duration 1
}
}
},
CType OBCU_ATO_Telegram_Builder {
InputPorts {
xix
InputPort psdDoorCommandState (Type: DoorCommand.
DoorCommand)
}
OutputPorts {
OutputPort OBCU_WCU_PlatformDoor (Type: DoorCommand.
DoorCommand)
}
Contracts {
Contract forwardingCommand {
guarantees {
[OBCU_WCU_PlatformDoor = psdDoorCommandState]
}
duration 1
}
}
},
CType OBCU_ATO_Out_Converter {
InputPorts {
InputPort openDoorCommand (Type: DoorCommand.
DoorCommand)
}
OutputPorts {
OutputPort TCL_O_Door_Opening_Closing (Type: Status.
INT)
}
xx
},
/*
* OBCU ITF Components
*/
CType OBCU_ITF_WWA_Telegram_Extractor {
InputPorts {
InputPort WCU_OBCU_MovementAuthority (Type: Authority
.STRING)
}
OutputPorts {
OutputPort rauz (Type: Status.INT)
}
},
CType OBCU_ITF_Out_Convertor {
InputPorts {
InputPort doorStatusHMI (Type: Status.INT),
InputPort psdStatusHMI (Type: Status.INT),
InputPort currentDoorModeHMI (Type: Status.INT),
InputPort doorReleaseStatusHMI (Type: Status.INT)
}
xxi
OutputPorts {
OutputPort HMI_O_Train_Door_Release (Type: Status.INT
),
OutputPort HMI_O_Train_Door_Mode (Type: Status.INT),
OutputPort HMI_O_PSD (Type: Status.INT),
OutputPort HMI_O_Train_Door_Status (Type: Status.INT)
}
},
CType OBCU_ITF_HMI_Status_Function {
InputPorts {
InputPort rauz (Type: Status.INT),
InputPort doorReleaseStatus (Type: Status.INT),
InputPort trainControlLevel (Type: Status.INT),
InputPort doorMode (Type: Status.INT),
InputPort doorStatus (Type: Status.INT)
}
OutputPorts {
OutputPort doorStatusHMI (Type: Status.INT),
OutputPort psdStatusHMI (Type: Status.INT),
OutputPort currentDoorModeHMI (Type: Status.INT),
OutputPort doorReleaseStatusHMI (Type: Status.INT)
}
},
xxii
CType OBCU_ITF_FWD_Movement_Authority {
InputPorts {
InputPort WCU_OBCU_MovementAuthority (Type: Authority
.STRING)
}
OutputPorts {
OutputPort WCU_OBCU_MovementAuthority (Type:
Authority.STRING)
}
},
CType OBCU_ITF_FWD_Position_Report {
InputPorts {
InputPort WCU_OBCU_PositionReport (Type:
PSD_Authorization.PSD_Authorization)
}
OutputPorts {
OutputPort WCU_OBCU_PositionReport_Out (Type:
PSD_Authorization.PSD_Authorization)
}
Contracts {
Contract forwardAuthorization {
guarantees {
[WCU_OBCU_PositionReport_Out =
WCU_OBCU_PositionReport]
}
xxiii
duration 1
}
}
},
CType OBCU_ITF_FWD_Platform_Door {
InputPorts {
InputPort WCU_OBCU_PlatformDoor (Type: DoorCommand.
DoorCommand)
}
OutputPorts {
OutputPort WCU_OBCU_PlatformDoor_Out (Type:
DoorCommand.DoorCommand)
}
Contracts {
Contract forwardingCommand {
guarantees {
[WCU_OBCU_PlatformDoor_Out = WCU_OBCU_PlatformDoor]
}
duration 1
}
}
},
xxiv
/*
* OBCU ATP Components
*/
CType OBCU_ATP_In_Converter {
InputPorts {
InputPort TCL_I_Door_Closed_Indication (Type:
DoorStatus.DoorStatus),
InputPort TCL_I_Door_Closed_Button (Type: Bool.
BOOLEAN)
}
OutputPorts {
OutputPort trainControlLevel (Type: Status.INT),
OutputPort cabPremissiveDoorButton (Type: Bool.
BOOLEAN),
OutputPort doorStatus (Type: DoorStatus.DoorStatus)
}
Contracts {
Contract forwardDoorStatus {
guarantees {
[doorStatus = TCL_I_Door_Closed_Indication]
}
duration 1
}
xxv
}},
CType OBCU_ATP_Out_Converter {
InputPorts {
InputPort propulsion (Type: Bool.BOOLEAN),
InputPort doorReleaseCommand (Type:
DoorReleaseCommand.DoorReleaseCommand)
}
OutputPorts {
OutputPort TCL_O_Propulsion_Release (Type: Bool.
BOOLEAN),
OutputPort TCL_O_Door_Release (Type: Bool.BOOLEAN)
}
Contracts {
Contract doorsReleased {
triggers {
doorsReleased: DoorReleaseCommand.
DT_DoorReleaseCommand_Left[doorReleaseCommand]
\/ DoorReleaseCommand.DT_DoorReleaseCommand_Right[
doorReleaseCommand]
\/ DoorReleaseCommand.DT_DoorReleaseCommand_Both[
doorReleaseCommand]
}
guarantees {
Bool.true[TCL_O_Door_Release]
xxvi
}duration 1
},
Contract doorsNotReleased {
triggers {
doorsReleased: DoorReleaseCommand.
DT_DoorReleaseCommand_Deactivate[
doorReleaseCommand]
}
guarantees {
Bool.true[TCL_O_Door_Release]
}
duration 1
}
}
},
CType OBCU_ATP_WMA_Telegram_Extractor{
InputPorts {
InputPort WCU_OBCU_MovementAuthority_out (Type:
Authority.STRING)
}
OutputPorts {
OutputPort rauz (Type: Status.INT)
}
xxvii
},
CType OBCU_ATP_PSD_Authorization_State_Tracker {
InputPorts {
InputPort authorizePSDOpening (Type:
PSD_Authorization.PSD_Authorization)
}
OutputPorts {
OutputPort psdAuthorizationState (Type:
PSD_Authorization.PSD_Authorization)
}
Contracts {
Contract forwardAuthorization {
guarantees {
[psdAuthorizationState = authorizePSDOpening]
}
duration 1
}
}
},
CType OBCU_ATP_PSD_Authorization_Controller {
InputPorts {
InputPort trainControlLevel (Type: TrainControlLevel.
TrainControlLevel),
InputPort doorReleaseStatus (Type: DoorReleaseStatus.
DoorReleaseStatus)
xxviii
}OutputPorts {
OutputPort authorizePSDOpening (Type:
PSD_Authorization.PSD_Authorization)
}
Contracts {
Contract notAuthorized {
triggers {
trainControlLevelCTC: TrainControlLevel.
DT_TrainControlLevel_CTC[trainControlLevel],
doorReleaseStatusLocked: DoorReleaseStatus.
DT_DoorReleaseStatus_Locked[doorReleaseStatus]
at 1
}
guarantees {
PSD_Authorization.
DT_PSD_Authorization_Not_Authorize[
authorizePSDOpening]
}
duration 2
},
Contract authorized {
triggers {
trainControlLevelCTC: TrainControlLevel.
DT_TrainControlLevel_ITC[trainControlLevel],
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doorReleaseStatusLocked: DoorReleaseStatus.
DT_DoorReleaseStatus_Released[doorReleaseStatus]
at 1
}
guarantees {
PSD_Authorization.DT_PSD_Authorization_Authorize[
authorizePSDOpening]
}
duration 2
}
}
},
CType OBCU_ATP_Telegram_Builder {
InputPorts {
InputPort psdAuthorizationState (Type:
PSD_Authorization.PSD_Authorization)
}
OutputPorts {
OutputPort OBCU_WCU_PositionReport (Type:
PSD_Authorization.PSD_Authorization)
}
Contracts {
Contract forwardAuthorization {
guarantees {
[OBCU_WCU_PositionReport = psdAuthorizationState]
xxx
}duration 1
}
}
},
CType OBCU_ATP_Propulson_Function {
InputPorts {
InputPort doorStatus (Type: Status.INT),
InputPort trainControlLevel (Type: Status.INT),
InputPort rauz (Type: Status.INT),
InputPort authorizePSDOpening (Type: Bool.BOOLEAN)
}
OutputPorts {
OutputPort propulsion (Type: Bool.BOOLEAN)
}
},
CType OBCU_ATP_Door_Release_Controller {
InputPorts {
InputPort doorStatus (Type: DoorStatus.DoorStatus),
InputPort trainControlLevel (Type: Status.INT),
InputPort trainOperationMode (Type: Status.INT),
InputPort platformPSDStatus (Type: Status.INT),
xxxi
InputPort cabPremissiveDoorButton (Type: Bool.BOOLEAN
),
InputPort berthed (Type: Status.INT),
InputPort stoppingWindowMinus (Type: Bool.BOOLEAN),
InputPort stoppingPoint (Type: Bool.BOOLEAN),
InputPort stopingWindowPlus (Type: Bool.BOOLEAN),
InputPort trainPosition (Type: Int.INT),
InputPort movingStatus (Type: MovingStatus.
MovingStatus),
InputPort platformSide (Type: DoorOpenStrategy.
DoorOpenStrategy)
}
OutputPorts {
OutputPort doorReleaseCommand (Type:
DoorReleaseCommand.DoorReleaseCommand),
OutputPort doorReleaseStatus (Type: DoorReleaseStatus
.DoorReleaseStatus),
OutputPort releaseForcedByPermissiveDoorButton (Type:
Bool.BOOLEAN)
}
Contracts {
Contract openingLeftDoorSide {
triggers {
trigger1: DoorOpenStrategy.DT_DoorOpenStrategy_Left
[platformSide]
}
xxxii
guarantees {
DoorReleaseCommand.DT_DoorReleaseCommand_Left[
doorReleaseCommand]
}
duration 1
},
Contract openingRightDoorSide {
triggers {
trigger1: DoorOpenStrategy.
DT_DoorOpenStrategy_Right[platformSide]
}
guarantees {
DoorReleaseCommand.DT_DoorReleaseCommand_Right[
doorReleaseCommand]
}
duration 1
},
Contract doorsReleased {
var trainInStoppingWindow: Bool.BOOLEAN,
var premissiveRelease: Bool.BOOLEAN
triggers {
standStill: MovingStatus.
DT_TrainMovingStatus_StandStill[movingStatus],
xxxiii
trainInStoppingPosition: Bool.true[
trainInStoppingWindow] at 1,
premissiveRelease: Bool.false[premissiveRelease] at
2
}
guarantees {
DoorReleaseStatus.DT_DoorReleaseStatus_Released[
doorReleaseStatus]
}
duration 2
},
Contract doorsNotReleasedWhileMoving {
triggers {
moving: MovingStatus.DT_TrainMovingStatus_Moving[
movingStatus]
}
guarantees {
DoorReleaseStatus.DT_DoorReleaseStatus_Locked[
doorReleaseStatus] /\
DoorReleaseCommand.DT_DoorReleaseCommand_Deactivate
[doorReleaseCommand]
}
duration 1
},
Contract doorsClosedWhenClosedIndication {
triggers {
xxxiv
closedIndication: DoorStatus.DT_DoorStatus_Closed[
doorStatus]
}
guarantees {
DoorReleaseStatus.DT_DoorReleaseStatus_Locked[
doorReleaseStatus] /\
DoorReleaseCommand.DT_DoorReleaseCommand_Deactivate
[doorReleaseCommand]
}
duration 1
},
Contract doorsReleasedIfStandstillAndInStoppingWindow
{
triggers {
standstill: MovingStatus.
DT_TrainMovingStatus_StandStill[movingStatus],
hasPSD: PlatformPSDStatus.
DT_PlatformPSDStatus_Has_PSD[platformPSDStatus]
at 1,
inStopingPosition: Bool.true[Comparison.ls[Int.sub[
stoppingPoint, stoppingWindowMinus],
trainPosition]] /\
Bool.true[Comparison.gt[Int.sub[stoppingPoint,
stopingWindowPlus], trainPosition]] at 2
}
guarantees {
DoorReleaseStatus.DT_DoorReleaseStatus_Released[
doorReleaseStatus]
xxxv
}duration 3
}
}
},
/*
* Wayside Components
*/
CType Wayside_In_Converter {
InputPorts {
InputPort PSD_I_PSD_Overwrite (Type: Bool.BOOLEAN),
InputPort PSD_I_PSD_Closed (Type: Bool.BOOLEAN),
InputPort ATS_I_Select_Door_Open_Strategy (Type:
Status.INT)
}
OutputPorts {
OutputPort selectedDoorStrategy (Type: Status.INT),
OutputPort psdClosed (Type: Status.INT),
OutputPort psdOverwrite (Type: Status.INT)
}
Contracts {
Contract selectedDoorStrategy {
xxxvi
guarantees {
[selectedDoorStrategy =
ATS_I_Select_Door_Open_Strategy]
}
duration 1
},
Contract psdClosed {
triggers {
trigger1: Bool.true[PSD_I_PSD_Closed]
}
guarantees {
DoorStatus.DT_DoorStatus_DoorsVitalClosed[psdClosed
]
}
duration 1
}
}
},
CType Wayside_OPD_Telegram_Extractor {
InputPorts {
InputPort OBCU_WCU_PlatformDoor (Type: DoorCommand.
DoorCommand)
}
OutputPorts {
xxxvii
OutputPort psdOpenCommand (Type: DoorCommand.
DoorCommand)
}
Contracts {
Contract forwardCommand {
guarantees {
[psdOpenCommand = OBCU_WCU_PlatformDoor]
}
duration 1
}
}
},
CType Wayside_OPR_Telegram_Extractor {
InputPorts {
InputPort OBCU_WCU_PositionReport (Type:
PSD_Authorization.PSD_Authorization)
}
OutputPorts {
OutputPort doorOpenAuthorization (Type:
PSD_Authorization.PSD_Authorization)
}
Contracts {
Contract forwardAuthorization {
guarantees {
xxxviii
[doorOpenAuthorization = OBCU_WCU_PositionReport]
}
duration 1
}
}
},
CType Wayside_PSD_Control_Function {
InputPorts {
InputPort trainControlLevel (Type: TrainControlLevel.
TrainControlLevel),
InputPort doorOpenAuthorization (Type:
PSD_Authorization.PSD_Authorization),
InputPort psdOpenCommand (Type: DoorCommand.
DoorCommand)
}
OutputPorts {
OutputPort psdOpen (Type: Bool.BOOLEAN)
}
Contracts {
Contract doorOpen {
triggers {
trainControlLevelITC: TrainControlLevel.
DT_TrainControlLevel_ITC[trainControlLevel],
xxxix
authorized: PSD_Authorization.
DT_PSD_Authorization_Authorize[
doorOpenAuthorization] at 1,
psdOpenCommand: DoorCommand.DT_DoorCommand_Open[
psdOpenCommand] at 2
}
guarantees {
Bool.true[psdOpen]
}
duration 3
},
Contract doorClosedCTC {
triggers {
trainControlLevelITC: TrainControlLevel.
DT_TrainControlLevel_CTC[trainControlLevel]
}
guarantees {
Bool.false[psdOpen]
}
duration 1
},
Contract doorClosedNotAuthorized {
triggers {
notAuthorized: PSD_Authorization.
DT_PSD_Authorization_Not_Authorize[
doorOpenAuthorization]
xl
}guarantees {
Bool.false[psdOpen]
}
duration 1
},
Contract doorClosed {
triggers {
notAuthorized: PSD_Authorization.
DT_PSD_Authorization_Not_Authorize[
doorOpenAuthorization],
psdCloseCommand: DoorCommand.DT_DoorCommand_Close[
psdOpenCommand] at 1
}
guarantees {
Bool.false[psdOpen]
}
duration 2
},
Contract doorClosedCommandClose {
triggers {
psdCloseCommand: DoorCommand.DT_DoorCommand_Close[
psdOpenCommand]
}
xli
guarantees {
Bool.false[psdOpen]
}
duration 1
}
}
},
CType Wayside_RAUZ_Control_Function {
InputPorts {
InputPort psdOverwrite (Type: Status.INT),
InputPort trainControlLevel (Type: Status.INT),
InputPort psdClosed (Type: Bool.BOOLEAN)
}
OutputPorts {
OutputPort rauz (Type: Status.INT),
OutputPort zoneBlockedATS (Type: Bool.BOOLEAN)
}
},
CType Wayside_Door_Strategy_Function {
InputPorts {
InputPort selectedDoorStrategy (Type: Status.INT),
InputPort defaultDoorStrategy (Type: Status.INT),
InputPort trainControlLevel (Type: Status.INT)
xlii
}OutputPorts {
OutputPort currentDoorStrategy (Type: Status.INT)
}
},
CType Wayside_ATS_Status_Function{
InputPorts {
InputPort currentDoorStrategy (Type: Status.INT),
InputPort trainControlLevel (Type: Status.INT)
}
OutputPorts {
OutputPort psdStatusATS (Type: Status.INT),
OutputPort psdAuthorizationATS (Type: Authority.
STRING),
OutputPort psdRequestATS (Type: Status.INT),
OutputPort doorStrategyStatusToATS (Type: Status.INT)
}
},
CType Wayside_PSD_Door_Command_State_Tracker {
InputPorts {
InputPort rauz (Type: Status.INT)
}
OutputPorts {
xliii
OutputPort rauzState (Type: Status.INT)
}
},
CType Wayside_TelegramBuilder {
InputPorts {
InputPort rausState (Type: Status.INT)
}
OutputPorts {
OutputPort WCU_OBCU_MovementAuthority (Type:
Authority.STRING)
}
},
CType Wayside_Out_Converter {
InputPorts {
InputPort psdOpen (Type: Bool.BOOLEAN),
InputPort psdStatusATS (Type: Status.INT),
InputPort psdAuthorizationATS (Type: Authority.STRING
),
InputPort psdRequestATS (Type: Status.INT),
InputPort doorStrategyStatusToATS (Type: Status.INT)
}
OutputPorts {
OutputPort PSD_O_PSD_Close (Type: Bool.BOOLEAN),
xliv
OutputPort PSD_O_PSD_Open (Type: Bool.BOOLEAN),
OutputPort ATS_O_PSD_Authorization (Type: Authority.
STRING),
OutputPort ATS_O_PSD_Status (Type: Status.INT),
OutputPort ATS_O_PSD_Request (Type: Status.INT),
OutputPort ATS_O_Door_Strategy (Type: Status.INT)
}
Contracts {
Contract psdOpen {
triggers {
open: Bool.true[psdOpen]
}
guarantees {
Bool.true[PSD_O_PSD_Open] /\ Bool.false[
PSD_O_PSD_Close]
}
duration 1
},
Contract psdClose {
triggers {
open: Bool.false[psdOpen]
}
guarantees {
xlv
Bool.false[PSD_O_PSD_Open] /\ Bool.true[
PSD_O_PSD_Close]
}
duration 1
}
}
}
}
Contracts {
// 1) If the train is moving, the PSDs are closed.
Contract PSDAreClosedWhenTrainIsMoving {
triggers {
trigger1: MovingStatus.DT_TrainMovingStatus_Moving[
OBCU_ATP_Door_Release_Controller.movingStatus]
}
guarantees {
Bool.true[Wayside_Out_Converter.PSD_O_PSD_Close] /\
Bool.false[Wayside_Out_Converter.PSD_O_PSD_Open]
}
duration 13
proof {
step1:
at 3
xlvi
have
DoorReleaseCommand.DT_DoorReleaseCommand_Deactivate[
OBCU_ATP_Door_Release_Controller.
doorReleaseCommand] /\
DoorReleaseStatus.DT_DoorReleaseStatus_Locked[
OBCU_ATP_Door_Release_Controller.doorReleaseStatus
]
from [
trigger1
]
using
OBCU_ATP_Door_Release_Controller.
doorsNotReleasedWhileMoving,
step2:
at 4
have
PSD_Authorization.DT_PSD_Authorization_Not_Authorize[
OBCU_ATP_PSD_Authorization_Controller.
authorizePSDOpening]
from [
step1 with [
(OBCU_ATP_PSD_Authorization_Controller.
doorReleaseStatus,
OBCU_ATP_Door_Release_Controller.doorReleaseStatus
)
]
]
xlvii
using
OBCU_ATP_PSD_Authorization_Controller.notAuthorized,
step3:
at 5
have
PSD_Authorization.DT_PSD_Authorization_Not_Authorize[
OBCU_ATP_PSD_Authorization_State_Tracker.
psdAuthorizationState]
from [
step2 with [
(OBCU_ATP_PSD_Authorization_State_Tracker.
authorizePSDOpening,
OBCU_ATP_PSD_Authorization_Controller.
authorizePSDOpening)
]
]
using
OBCU_ATP_PSD_Authorization_State_Tracker.
forwardAuthorization,
step4:
at 6
have
PSD_Authorization.DT_PSD_Authorization_Not_Authorize[
OBCU_ATP_Telegram_Builder.OBCU_WCU_PositionReport]
from [
step3 with [
xlviii
(OBCU_ATP_Telegram_Builder.psdAuthorizationState,
OBCU_ATP_PSD_Authorization_State_Tracker.
psdAuthorizationState)
]
]
using
OBCU_ATP_Telegram_Builder.forwardAuthorization,
step5:
at 4
have
DoorCommand.DT_DoorCommand_Close[
OBCU_ATO_Door_Open_Controller.doorOpenCommand]
from [
step1 with [
(OBCU_ATO_Door_Open_Controller.doorReleaseStatus,
OBCU_ATP_Door_Release_Controller.doorReleaseStatus
)
]
]
using
OBCU_ATO_Door_Open_Controller.doorsClosed,
step6:
at 5
have
DoorCommand.DT_DoorCommand_Close[
OBCU_ATO_PSD_Door_Controller.psdDoorCommand]
xlix
from [
step5 with [
(OBCU_ATO_PSD_Door_Controller.psdDoorCommand,
OBCU_ATO_Door_Open_Controller.doorReleaseStatus)
]
]
using
OBCU_ATO_PSD_Door_Controller.forwardDoorCommand,
step7:
at 6
have
DoorCommand.DT_DoorCommand_Close[
OBCU_ATO_PSD_Door_Command_State.
psdDoorCommandState]
from [
step6 with [
(OBCU_ATO_PSD_Door_Command_State.openDoorCommand,
OBCU_ATO_PSD_Door_Controller.psdDoorCommand)
]
]
using
OBCU_ATO_PSD_Door_Command_State.forwardingCommand,
step8:
at 7
l
have
DoorCommand.DT_DoorCommand_Close[
OBCU_ATO_Telegram_Builder.OBCU_WCU_PlatformDoor]
from [
step7 with [
(OBCU_ATO_Telegram_Builder.psdDoorCommandState,
OBCU_ATO_PSD_Door_Command_State.
psdDoorCommandState)
]
]
using
OBCU_ATO_Telegram_Builder.forwardingCommand,
step9:
at 8
have
DoorCommand.DT_DoorCommand_Close[
OBCU_ITF_FWD_Platform_Door.
WCU_OBCU_PlatformDoor_Out]
from [
step8 with [
(OBCU_ITF_FWD_Platform_Door.WCU_OBCU_PlatformDoor,
OBCU_ATO_Telegram_Builder.OBCU_WCU_PlatformDoor)
]
]
using
OBCU_ITF_FWD_Platform_Door.forwardingCommand,
li
step10:
at 7
have
PSD_Authorization.DT_PSD_Authorization_Not_Authorize[
OBCU_ITF_FWD_Position_Report.
WCU_OBCU_PositionReport_Out]
from [
step4 with [
(OBCU_ITF_FWD_Position_Report.WCU_OBCU_PositionReport
, OBCU_ATP_Telegram_Builder.
OBCU_WCU_PositionReport)
]
]
using
OBCU_ITF_FWD_Position_Report.forwardAuthorization,
step11:
at 8
have
PSD_Authorization.DT_PSD_Authorization_Not_Authorize[
Wayside_OPR_Telegram_Extractor.
doorOpenAuthorization]
from [
step10 with [
(Wayside_OPR_Telegram_Extractor.
OBCU_WCU_PositionReport,
OBCU_ITF_FWD_Position_Report.
WCU_OBCU_PositionReport_Out)
lii
]]
using
Wayside_OPR_Telegram_Extractor.forwardAuthorization,
step12:
at 9
have
DoorCommand.DT_DoorCommand_Close[
Wayside_OPD_Telegram_Extractor.psdOpenCommand]
from [
step9 with [
(Wayside_OPD_Telegram_Extractor.OBCU_WCU_PlatformDoor
, OBCU_ITF_FWD_Platform_Door.
WCU_OBCU_PlatformDoor_Out)
]
]
using
Wayside_OPD_Telegram_Extractor.forwardCommand,
step13:
at 11
have
Bool.false[Wayside_PSD_Control_Function.psdOpen]
from [
step12 with [
liii
(Wayside_PSD_Control_Function.psdOpenCommand,
Wayside_OPD_Telegram_Extractor.psdOpenCommand)
],
step11 with [
(Wayside_PSD_Control_Function.doorOpenAuthorization,
Wayside_OPR_Telegram_Extractor.
doorOpenAuthorization)
]
]
using
Wayside_PSD_Control_Function.doorClosed,
step14:
at 13
have
Bool.true[Wayside_Out_Converter.PSD_O_PSD_Close] /\
Bool.false[Wayside_Out_Converter.PSD_O_PSD_Open]
from [
step13 with [
(Wayside_Out_Converter.psdOpen,
Wayside_PSD_Control_Function.psdOpen)
]
]
using
Wayside_Out_Converter.psdClose
}
liv
},
// 2) If the train is at standstill and the position of
the train doors match the position of the PSDs,
then, the PSDs are opened.
Contract PSDAreOpenIfNotMovingAndMatchingPosition {
triggers {
standstill: MovingStatus.
DT_TrainMovingStatus_StandStill[
OBCU_ATP_Door_Release_Controller.movingStatus],
hasPSD: PlatformPSDStatus.
DT_PlatformPSDStatus_Has_PSD[
OBCU_ATP_Door_Release_Controller.platformPSDStatus
] at 1,
inStopingPosition: Bool.true[Comparison.ls[Int.sub[
OBCU_ATP_Door_Release_Controller.stoppingPoint,
OBCU_ATP_Door_Release_Controller.
stoppingWindowMinus],
OBCU_ATP_Door_Release_Controller.trainPosition]]
/\
Bool.true[Comparison.gt[Int.sub[
OBCU_ATP_Door_Release_Controller.stoppingPoint,
OBCU_ATP_Door_Release_Controller.stopingWindowPlus
], OBCU_ATP_Door_Release_Controller.trainPosition
]] at 2
}
guarantees {
Bool.true[Wayside_Out_Converter.PSD_O_PSD_Open] /\
Bool.false[Wayside_Out_Converter.PSD_O_PSD_Close]
}
duration 13
proof {
lv
step1:
at 3
have
DoorReleaseCommand.DT_DoorReleaseCommand_Deactivate[
OBCU_ATP_Door_Release_Controller.
doorReleaseCommand] /\
DoorReleaseStatus.DT_DoorReleaseStatus_Locked[
OBCU_ATP_Door_Release_Controller.doorReleaseStatus
]
from [
standstill, hasPSD, inStopingPosition
]
using
OBCU_ATP_Door_Release_Controller.
doorsReleasedIfStandstillAndInStoppingWindow,
step2:
at 4
have
PSD_Authorization.DT_PSD_Authorization_Authorize[
OBCU_ATP_PSD_Authorization_Controller.
authorizePSDOpening]
from [
step1 with [
(OBCU_ATP_PSD_Authorization_Controller.
doorReleaseStatus,
OBCU_ATP_Door_Release_Controller.doorReleaseStatus
)
lvi
]]
using
OBCU_ATP_PSD_Authorization_Controller.notAuthorized,
step3:
at 5
have
PSD_Authorization.DT_PSD_Authorization_Authorize[
OBCU_ATP_PSD_Authorization_State_Tracker.
psdAuthorizationState]
from [
step2 with [
(OBCU_ATP_PSD_Authorization_State_Tracker.
authorizePSDOpening,
OBCU_ATP_PSD_Authorization_Controller.
authorizePSDOpening)
]
]
using
OBCU_ATP_PSD_Authorization_State_Tracker.
forwardAuthorization,
step4:
at 6
have
PSD_Authorization.DT_PSD_Authorization_Authorize[
OBCU_ATP_Telegram_Builder.OBCU_WCU_PositionReport]
lvii
from [
step3 with [
(OBCU_ATP_Telegram_Builder.psdAuthorizationState,
OBCU_ATP_PSD_Authorization_State_Tracker.
psdAuthorizationState)
]
]
using
OBCU_ATP_Telegram_Builder.forwardAuthorization,
step5:
at 4
have
DoorCommand.DT_DoorCommand_Open[
OBCU_ATO_Door_Open_Controller.doorOpenCommand]
from [
step1 with [
(OBCU_ATO_Door_Open_Controller.doorReleaseStatus,
OBCU_ATP_Door_Release_Controller.doorReleaseStatus
)
]
]
using
OBCU_ATO_Door_Open_Controller.doorsClosed,
step6:
at 5
lviii
have
DoorCommand.DT_DoorCommand_Open[
OBCU_ATO_PSD_Door_Controller.psdDoorCommand]
from [
step5 with [
(OBCU_ATO_PSD_Door_Controller.psdDoorCommand,
OBCU_ATO_Door_Open_Controller.doorReleaseStatus)
]
]
using
OBCU_ATO_PSD_Door_Controller.forwardDoorCommand,
step7:
at 6
have
DoorCommand.DT_DoorCommand_Open[
OBCU_ATO_PSD_Door_Command_State.
psdDoorCommandState]
from [
step6 with [
(OBCU_ATO_PSD_Door_Command_State.openDoorCommand,
OBCU_ATO_PSD_Door_Controller.psdDoorCommand)
]
]
using
OBCU_ATO_PSD_Door_Command_State.forwardingCommand,
lix
step8:
at 7
have
DoorCommand.DT_DoorCommand_Open[
OBCU_ATO_Telegram_Builder.OBCU_WCU_PlatformDoor]
from [
step7 with [
(OBCU_ATO_Telegram_Builder.psdDoorCommandState,
OBCU_ATO_PSD_Door_Command_State.
psdDoorCommandState)
]
]
using
OBCU_ATO_Telegram_Builder.forwardingCommand,
step9:
at 8
have
DoorCommand.DT_DoorCommand_Open[
OBCU_ITF_FWD_Platform_Door.
WCU_OBCU_PlatformDoor_Out]
from [
step8 with [
(OBCU_ITF_FWD_Platform_Door.WCU_OBCU_PlatformDoor,
OBCU_ATO_Telegram_Builder.OBCU_WCU_PlatformDoor)
]
]
lx
using
OBCU_ITF_FWD_Platform_Door.forwardingCommand,
step10:
at 7
have
PSD_Authorization.DT_PSD_Authorization_Authorize[
OBCU_ITF_FWD_Position_Report.
WCU_OBCU_PositionReport_Out]
from [
step4 with [
(OBCU_ITF_FWD_Position_Report.WCU_OBCU_PositionReport
, OBCU_ATP_Telegram_Builder.
OBCU_WCU_PositionReport)
]
]
using
OBCU_ITF_FWD_Position_Report.forwardAuthorization,
step11:
at 8
have
PSD_Authorization.DT_PSD_Authorization_Authorize[
Wayside_OPR_Telegram_Extractor.
doorOpenAuthorization]
from [
step10 with [
lxi
(Wayside_OPR_Telegram_Extractor.
OBCU_WCU_PositionReport,
OBCU_ITF_FWD_Position_Report.
WCU_OBCU_PositionReport_Out)
]
]
using
Wayside_OPR_Telegram_Extractor.forwardAuthorization,
step12:
at 9
have
DoorCommand.DT_DoorCommand_Open[
Wayside_OPD_Telegram_Extractor.psdOpenCommand]
from [
step9 with [
(Wayside_OPD_Telegram_Extractor.OBCU_WCU_PlatformDoor
, OBCU_ITF_FWD_Platform_Door.
WCU_OBCU_PlatformDoor_Out)
]
]
using
Wayside_OPD_Telegram_Extractor.forwardCommand,
step13:
at 11
have
Bool.true[Wayside_PSD_Control_Function.psdOpen]
lxii
from [
step12 with [
(Wayside_PSD_Control_Function.psdOpenCommand,
Wayside_OPD_Telegram_Extractor.psdOpenCommand)
],
step11 with [
(Wayside_PSD_Control_Function.doorOpenAuthorization,
Wayside_OPR_Telegram_Extractor.
doorOpenAuthorization)
]
]
using
Wayside_PSD_Control_Function.doorClosed,
step14:
at 13
have
Bool.true[Wayside_Out_Converter.PSD_O_PSD_Close] /\
Bool.false[Wayside_Out_Converter.PSD_O_PSD_Open]
from [
step13 with [
(Wayside_Out_Converter.psdOpen,
Wayside_PSD_Control_Function.psdOpen)
]
]
using
lxiii
Wayside_Out_Converter.psdClose
}
},
// 3) If the train doors open on the right hand side,
the platform must be on the right hand
Contract trainOpensTheDoorOnTheRightSide {
triggers {
openRightDoorStrategy: DoorOpenStrategy.
DT_DoorOpenStrategy_Right[
OBCU_ATP_Door_Release_Controller.platformSide]
}
guarantees {
DoorReleaseCommand.DT_DoorReleaseCommand_Right[
OBCU_ATP_Door_Release_Controller.
doorReleaseCommand]
}
duration 1
proof {
step1:
at 1
have
DoorReleaseCommand.DT_DoorReleaseCommand_Right[
OBCU_ATP_Door_Release_Controller.
doorReleaseCommand]
from [
lxiv
openRightDoorStrategy
]
using
OBCU_ATP_Door_Release_Controller.openingRightDoorSide
}
},
// 4) If permissive release and the train is at
standstill then both doors are open
Contract trainOpensTheDoorOnTheRightSide {
triggers {
standstill: MovingStatus.
DT_TrainMovingStatus_StandStill[
OBCU_ATP_Door_Release_Controller.movingStatus],
permissiveButtonPresset: Bool.true[
OBCU_ATP_Door_Release_Controller.
cabPremissiveDoorButton]
}
guarantees {
Bool.true[Wayside_Out_Converter.PSD_O_PSD_Open] /\
Bool.false[Wayside_Out_Converter.PSD_O_PSD_Close]
/\
DoorReleaseCommand.DT_DoorReleaseCommand_Right[
OBCU_ATP_Door_Release_Controller.
doorReleaseCommand]
}
duration 1
proof {
lxv
step1:
at 3
have
DoorReleaseCommand.DT_DoorReleaseCommand_Both[
OBCU_ATP_Door_Release_Controller.
doorReleaseCommand] /\
DoorReleaseStatus.DT_DoorReleaseStatus_Released[
OBCU_ATP_Door_Release_Controller.doorStatus] /\
Bool.true[OBCU_ATP_Door_Release_Controller.
releaseForcedByPermissiveDoorButton]
from [
standstill, permissiveButtonPresset
]
using
OBCU_ATP_Door_Release_Controller.
doorsReleasedIfStandstillAndInStoppingWindow
}
},
// 5) When the train indicates that the doors are
closed, PSDs are closed
Contract PSDAreClosedWhenTrainGivesClosedIndication {
triggers {
trigger1: DoorStatus.DT_DoorStatus_DoorsVitalClosed[
OBCU_ATP_In_Converter.TCL_I_Door_Closed_Indication
]
}
lxvi
guarantees {
Bool.true[Wayside_Out_Converter.PSD_O_PSD_Close] /\
Bool.false[Wayside_Out_Converter.PSD_O_PSD_Open]
}
duration 14
proof {
step1:
at 1
have
DoorStatus.DT_DoorStatus_DoorsVitalClosed[
OBCU_ATP_In_Converter.doorStatus]
from [
trigger1
]
using
OBCU_ATP_In_Converter.forwardDoorStatus,
step2:
at 4
have
DoorReleaseCommand.DT_DoorReleaseCommand_Deactivate[
OBCU_ATP_Door_Release_Controller.
doorReleaseCommand] /\
DoorReleaseStatus.DT_DoorReleaseStatus_Locked[
OBCU_ATP_Door_Release_Controller.doorReleaseStatus
]
from [
lxvii
step1 with [
(OBCU_ATP_Door_Release_Controller.doorStatus,
OBCU_ATP_In_Converter.doorStatus)
]
]
using
OBCU_ATP_Door_Release_Controller.
doorsClosedWhenClosedIndication,
step3:
at 5
have
PSD_Authorization.DT_PSD_Authorization_Not_Authorize[
OBCU_ATP_PSD_Authorization_Controller.
authorizePSDOpening]
from [
step2 with [
(OBCU_ATP_PSD_Authorization_Controller.
doorReleaseStatus,
OBCU_ATP_Door_Release_Controller.doorReleaseStatus
)
]
]
using
OBCU_ATP_PSD_Authorization_Controller.notAuthorized,
step4:
at 6
lxviii
have
PSD_Authorization.DT_PSD_Authorization_Not_Authorize[
OBCU_ATP_PSD_Authorization_State_Tracker.
psdAuthorizationState]
from [
step3 with [
(OBCU_ATP_PSD_Authorization_State_Tracker.
authorizePSDOpening,
OBCU_ATP_PSD_Authorization_Controller.
authorizePSDOpening)
]
]
using
OBCU_ATP_PSD_Authorization_State_Tracker.
forwardAuthorization,
step5:
at 7
have
PSD_Authorization.DT_PSD_Authorization_Not_Authorize[
OBCU_ATP_Telegram_Builder.OBCU_WCU_PositionReport]
from [
step4 with [
(OBCU_ATP_Telegram_Builder.psdAuthorizationState,
OBCU_ATP_PSD_Authorization_State_Tracker.
psdAuthorizationState)
]
]
lxix
using
OBCU_ATP_Telegram_Builder.forwardAuthorization,
step6:
at 5
have
DoorCommand.DT_DoorCommand_Close[
OBCU_ATO_Door_Open_Controller.doorOpenCommand]
from [
step2 with [
(OBCU_ATO_Door_Open_Controller.doorReleaseStatus,
OBCU_ATP_Door_Release_Controller.doorReleaseStatus
)
]
]
using
OBCU_ATO_Door_Open_Controller.doorsClosed,
step7:
at 6
have
DoorCommand.DT_DoorCommand_Close[
OBCU_ATO_PSD_Door_Controller.psdDoorCommand]
from [
step6 with [
(OBCU_ATO_PSD_Door_Controller.psdDoorCommand,
OBCU_ATO_Door_Open_Controller.doorReleaseStatus)
lxx
]]
using
OBCU_ATO_PSD_Door_Controller.forwardDoorCommand,
step8:
at 7
have
DoorCommand.DT_DoorCommand_Close[
OBCU_ATO_PSD_Door_Command_State.
psdDoorCommandState]
from [
step7 with [
(OBCU_ATO_PSD_Door_Command_State.openDoorCommand,
OBCU_ATO_PSD_Door_Controller.psdDoorCommand)
]
]
using
OBCU_ATO_PSD_Door_Command_State.forwardingCommand,
step9:
at 8
have
DoorCommand.DT_DoorCommand_Close[
OBCU_ATO_Telegram_Builder.OBCU_WCU_PlatformDoor]
from [
lxxi
step8 with [
(OBCU_ATO_Telegram_Builder.psdDoorCommandState,
OBCU_ATO_PSD_Door_Command_State.
psdDoorCommandState)
]
]
using
OBCU_ATO_Telegram_Builder.forwardingCommand,
step10:
at 9
have
DoorCommand.DT_DoorCommand_Close[
OBCU_ITF_FWD_Platform_Door.
WCU_OBCU_PlatformDoor_Out]
from [
step9 with [
(OBCU_ITF_FWD_Platform_Door.WCU_OBCU_PlatformDoor,
OBCU_ATO_Telegram_Builder.OBCU_WCU_PlatformDoor)
]
]
using
OBCU_ITF_FWD_Platform_Door.forwardingCommand,
step11:
at 8
have
lxxii
PSD_Authorization.DT_PSD_Authorization_Not_Authorize[
OBCU_ITF_FWD_Position_Report.
WCU_OBCU_PositionReport_Out]
from [
step5 with [
(OBCU_ITF_FWD_Position_Report.WCU_OBCU_PositionReport
, OBCU_ATP_Telegram_Builder.
OBCU_WCU_PositionReport)
]
]
using
OBCU_ITF_FWD_Position_Report.forwardAuthorization,
step12:
at 9
have
PSD_Authorization.DT_PSD_Authorization_Not_Authorize[
Wayside_OPR_Telegram_Extractor.
doorOpenAuthorization]
from [
step11 with [
(Wayside_OPR_Telegram_Extractor.
OBCU_WCU_PositionReport,
OBCU_ITF_FWD_Position_Report.
WCU_OBCU_PositionReport_Out)
]
]
using
lxxiii
Wayside_OPR_Telegram_Extractor.forwardAuthorization,
step13:
at 10
have
DoorCommand.DT_DoorCommand_Close[
Wayside_OPD_Telegram_Extractor.psdOpenCommand]
from [
step10 with [
(Wayside_OPD_Telegram_Extractor.OBCU_WCU_PlatformDoor
, OBCU_ITF_FWD_Platform_Door.
WCU_OBCU_PlatformDoor_Out)
]
]
using
Wayside_OPD_Telegram_Extractor.forwardCommand,
step14:
at 12
have
Bool.false[Wayside_PSD_Control_Function.psdOpen]
from [
step12 with [
(Wayside_PSD_Control_Function.doorOpenAuthorization,
Wayside_OPR_Telegram_Extractor.
doorOpenAuthorization)
],
lxxiv
step13 with [
(Wayside_PSD_Control_Function.psdOpenCommand,
Wayside_OPD_Telegram_Extractor.psdOpenCommand)
]
]
using
Wayside_PSD_Control_Function.doorClosed,
step15:
at 14
have
Bool.true[Wayside_Out_Converter.PSD_O_PSD_Close] /\
Bool.false[Wayside_Out_Converter.PSD_O_PSD_Open]
from [
step14 with [
(Wayside_Out_Converter.psdOpen,
Wayside_PSD_Control_Function.psdOpen)
]
]
using
Wayside_Out_Converter.psdClose
}
}
}
}
lxxv
